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A JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND THE ARTS

MARCH 22, 2004 WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUE 4,653 VOLUME 230

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

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CORRESPONDENCE

RADIO GA-GA

JASON ZENGERLE'S ARTICLE WAS A fair piece of work ("Talking Back," February 16). Democracy Radio may succeed, who knows? But black people are an important component of the Democratic Party and the left-wing coalition, and I doubt if they will give up black radio for Al Franken. This absence of an important listener constituency is likely to affect Democracy Radio's programming and tone. The stereotypical white, affluent, professional Democrat is going to be difficult to lure away from National Public Radio, which is an audio bulletin board for liberals. Rush Limbaugh may be first and foremost a brilliant radio entertainer, but his audience clearly shot up because he is filling a rather large media-market niche that was dealt with contemptuously by the major media and entertainment organizations, i.e., the people who thought Ronald Reagan was a good president.

Limbaugh also appears from my observations to appeal to a lot of people who aren't particularly "political" in the sense of being absorbed in the minutiae of American politics. One more problem for Democracy Radio, by contrast, isn't so much that white, middle-class liberals are too intelligent to get fresh information from a radio ranter—it's that they think they are.

MARK RICHARD
Columbus, Ohio

IN "TALKING BACK," JASON ZENGERLE misses a not-so-entertaining theory for the dearth of successful radio talk-show hosts: McCarthyism and the cold war. For decades, liberals have held their tongues because on some level they were worried about being called un-American communists. While the right has been able to simplify its message, the left has not had that luxury for 50 years. Being anti-establishment on the left has meant being a "commie agent" until this century. Even today, no one


THE WORST AND MOST FASHIONABLE PAINTER IN AMERICA
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MOVE OVER RUSH
So far, liberal talk radio has failed. That may be about to change.
JASON ZENGERLE

wants to be thought of as a lefty, un-American, or a bleeding-heart pacifist—all of which the right continues to charge the left with either directly or through innuendo. Isn't Rush Limbaugh a caricature of Joe McCarthy: arrogant and loud?

VICKI STEARN
Bethesda, Maryland

LIVING A LIE

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EDITORial "Kay Sera," the editors "wonder whether President Bush really wants to get to the bottom of the Iraq intelligence story at all" (February 16). Really? Bush's claim about African yellowcake turned out to be untrue, so the press and Democrats asked, "Who put this mistake in the president's speech?" Then Bush's claims about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) turned out to be untrue, so the press and Democrats cried, "We must find out who told this lie to the president!" Just this once, let's make it plain: The president lied to the American people and to the world about the reason for the war, which was probably to try to establish

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democracy in an Arab nation because democracy is what we have to offer the oppressed and hopeless people of the Middle East as an alternative to terrorism—a goal the president feared we would not understand or support. Intelligence about Saddam Hussein's WMD was never the reason for the war, but it was a story the White House knew the American people could understand and could be frightened into believing. Now, having told his lie so many times, the president is now stuck with it. He was right about one thing, though: We sure are gullible.

MICHAEL HICKEY
Palm Springs, California

CAST AWAY

CLAY RISEN'S ARTICLE, "MISSED Target," is aptly named (February 2). I was disappointed to see that Risen missed the target with his interpretation of Forrester Research's work on offshoring. While I wrote the brief "3.3 Million U.S. Services Jobs To Go Offshore" after conducting surveys with a number of business leaders, they were not casual conversations, nor the sole basis for my analysis.

In addition to a survey of 150 Fortune 1,000 companies, the research model for this brief was developed after three months of background research, two trips to India to meet with offshore companies, and an assessment of 525 services job categories. I also worked with a team of analysts on this brief. The model itself looked at how 18 different occupational categories in the services sector of the U.S. economy would be impacted by lower-cost offshore options. Once we defined the four main factors in the offshore decision process, we created a five-tier ranking of the impact of offshoring. This ranking was then applied to 505 Department of Labor occupational categories. We also reviewed the Department of Labor's Bureau of Statistics data on National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.

Risen is correct; it is a complex effort to precisely measure the number of jobs that will be lost to the move offshore. The discussion around offshore outsourcing remains a passionate one—one that requires an understanding of the existing and complex data.

JOHN MCCARTHY
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

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Pocket Veto

TRB FROM WASHINGTON

IT'S EASY TO POKE FUN AT PRESIdent Bush's new reelection ads. Even by the standards of the genre, they're vacuous. Amid the montages of hopeful-looking children, resolute-looking firemen, and responsible-looking parents, I had to search hard for a statement of fact. And, when I found one, it was false. The Bush ad titled "Safer, Stronger" declares, "January 2001. The challenge: an economy in recession." But, as *The Washington Post*'s Dana Milbank has noted, the National Bureau of Economic Research, which officially dates these things, says the economy *wasn't* in recession in January 2001—the recession didn't begin until March. The two-month discrepancy hardly makes much difference to your assessment of Bush's economic performance. Still, given that the president is hurting politically because many Americans no longer consider him trustworthy, it's odd that he kicked off his reelection bid with a statement that's demonstrably untrue.

But most critics haven't called the ads dumb or dishonest; they've called them offensive. And, in so doing, they're providing another case study in how identity politics threatens unfettered debate.

Three of Bush's four new ads feature images from September 11. One—"Safer, Stronger"—briefly shows firefighters carrying a flag-draped casket from the wreckage of Ground Zero. Some critics have focused on the casket alone, arguing that campaign commercials should never show the dead. On that narrow question, reasonable people can disagree. (Although, I doubt many liberals would object to a Moveon.org ad portraying caskets returning from Iraq.) But most of the objections have been broader—against the use of any September 11 images in political ads. And they have gained media traction because of the people objecting: family members of the September 11 dead and spokesmen for firefighters—people with a special connection to that terrible day.

"Nine-eleven families are very sensitive to someone using images of our loved one's death for their own ends," explained Kelly Campbell, co-director of September Eleventh Families for Peaceful Tomorrows. "I think one needs to be aware that firefighters and those whose families died on September 11 bring a very strong emotional reaction to any use of images from that time," added Kathleen Hall Jamieson, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg Public Policy Center. Of course they do. But recognizing someone's pain doesn't mean giving them veto power over the scope of debate. African American students often find racist speech on campus deeply hurtful, but that doesn't mean it should be banned. In 1952, when Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion began negotiating reparation payments with West Germany, Holocaust survivors attacked the Knesset. Ben Gurion may have been insensitive. But, as a leader charged with promoting the national interest, he was right not to make sensitivity his primary concern.

But, for the Democrats condemning the Bush ads, sensitivity is the only issue. The Kerry campaign didn't even suggest it believed there was anything wrong with the ads; it merely noted that they were offensive to the September 11 families, as if that were all that mattered. The hollowness of that strategy became clear almost immediately—when the Bush campaign trotted out other September 11 family members who thought the images were perfectly fine. It was a classic illustration of the way identity politics catches up with the left. Liberals often imply that affirmative action is good, or abortion is necessary, because the people most affected—blacks or women—think so. And so conservatives find black people who oppose affirmative action or women who oppose abortion. (The White House has done this time and again with its judicial nominees.) And liberals, having suggested that authority stems from identity rather than argument, are hoisted on their own petard.

Just as no political perspective stems inherently from being black, none stems from seeing a loved one die at the World Trade Center. For September 11 family members, as for the country at large, the event has been refracted through preexisting political beliefs. And so views about Bush's September 11 ads closely tracked views about Bush himself. Patricia Reilly, whose sister died on 9/11, said, "I don't have a problem with his pointing to his leadership at that time. He helped us to weather it." By contrast, Wright Salisbury, whose son-in-law died at the World Trade Center, clearly thinks Bush's "leadership" made things worse. "I think it's outrageous that he should use our grief to promote his candidacy," he said. "I understand why he's doing this. He's trying to cover himself with the flag. He's trying to justify the war in Iraq by saying it had something to do with nine-eleven." Harold Schaitberger, general president of the pro–John Kerry International Association of Firefighters, said, "Bush is calling on the biggest disaster in our country's history, and indeed, in the history of the fire service, to win sympathy for his campaign. But, for two and a half years, he has basically shortchanged firefighters and the safety of our homeland by not providing firefighters the resources needed." So, if Bush had adequately funded firefighters, his use of September 11 images would have been OK?

Democrats are missing the point: The real outrage isn't that the Bush campaign plans to endlessly discuss September 11; it's that it plans to do so while limiting other people's ability to do the same. The White House censored a portion of the congressional September 11 report that fingered Saudi Arabia—denying voters information about our ally's role in the murder of 3,000 Americans. House Speaker Denny Hastert, backed by conservative editorial pages (and perhaps the White House), tried to deny the independent 9/11 Commission time to finish its work—making the nakedly hypocritical argument that its findings shouldn't be a factor in the 2004 campaign. And, when Democratic candidate Wesley Clark said Bush didn't do everything he could have to stop September 11, Republicans denounced his comments as beyond the pale.

In the wake of last week's ads, critics have thrown Bush's 2002 statement that "I have no ambition whatsoever to use this [September 11] as a political issue" back in his face. But Bush was wrong then and right now: He's entitled to make September 11 a political issue. In fact, Democrats badly erred in 2002 by ignoring it and focusing on domestic issues. But, if Bush can make September 11 an issue, other Americans should be able to as well—and this administration has tried to deny them the means to do so. That's what I call offensive. **PETER BEINART**

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Tough Shiite

WHEN FIVE SHIA members of the Iraqi Governing Council dramatically (if temporarily) refused to sign the provisional Iraqi constitution last week, a senior American official dutifully told *The Washington Post* the walkout was no big deal. After all, the objections raised by the five council members had nothing to do with the laboriously negotiated provisions for individual rights

enshrined in the provisional constitution, technically known as the Transitional Administrative Law. Rather, the Shia were trying to redraw the composition of Iraq's future presidency to increase Shia influence and protesting a clause giving the Kurds an effective veto over the country's yet-to-be-written permanent constitution. But, the official explained, the United States wasn't worried: These sectarian disputes didn't "relate to any of our red lines."

What is most scary about this response is that it is probably true. Although the United States worked hard to guarantee the provisional constitution would bring liberalism to the Tigris—for example, by ensuring that Islamic law would not be the sole basis of legislation—it seems to have devoted shockingly little effort to mediating Iraq's deep ethnic and religious fissures. The results of this approach were on display this week when the constitution was finally signed: While it offers Iraqis sweeping guarantees for their individual liberties, it entrenches their bitter factionalism into the very architecture of government. And, as this weekend's walkout indicated, that factionalism is the greatest threat not only to the individual liberties the United States has worked so hard to enshrine, but to any hope of a stable, democratic Iraq.

The challenge faced in the provisional constitution was to create a form of federalism that could preserve Iraq as a unitary state (in particular, by averting Kurdish secession) while simultaneously preventing any ethnic faction from dominating the others. But the document utterly fails to strike this balance, offering instead a formula for the creation of large, quasi-independent ethnic blocs. Specifically, Article 53(A) recognizes the Kurdistan Regional Government—the autonomous authority the Kurds established after the 1991 Gulf war—as the "official government" in the Kurdish north. It will have "regional control over police forces and internal security"—which is to say, the Kurdish *peshmerga* militia. What's more, as long as the Kurdish authority doesn't intrude on national policy—e.g., foreign relations or oil policy—it "shall be permitted to amend the application of any [federal] law within the Kurdistan region." The Kurds, in other words, can effectively decide for themselves which national laws they will enforce and which they will disregard. This is called nullification, and in nineteenth-century America it was the precursor to Southern secession.



And it's not just the Kurds. As the *Post* reported on March 2, when Shia members of the Governing Council heard the Kurdish proposal for autonomy, they decided that they wanted the same. As a result, Article 53(C) extends the Kurdistan model to the rest of the country: "Any group of no more than three governorates outside the Kurdistan region, with the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, shall have the right to form regions from amongst themselves." There is nothing else in the constitution about what powers those super-governorates, sure to be established on ethnic grounds, will possess. But they are implicitly offered the same terms as the Kurds: legitimized internal militias and nullification authority. (Indeed, while militias *per se* are declared illegal by Article 27, that same provision explicitly allows for regional armed forces "as provided by federal law.") As a senior coalition official explains, the ability of ethnic blocs to consolidate into regional ministates was intended to "arrive at a more symmetrical federalism," in which Iraq's other factions could match the power of the Kurds.

But there's more than one way to create symmetry. Before the war, the Democratic Principles Working Group of the State Department's Future of Iraq Project conceived of an "administrative federalism" that would have redrawn the boundaries of Iraq's provinces in an effort to diminish the impact of ethnic or religious factionalism. "The future all-Iraqi federation should not be one of competing nationalities," the Working Group wrote. "A federal arrangement ... actively seeks in the drawing up of boundaries a mixture of national[ities], ethnicities and religions in each region, not their separation one from the other." The provisional constitution's formula is precisely the opposite: It opens the door to competing armed, ethnically based ministates with the ability to reject federal law when they please. Is this what we went to war to create? ■

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NOTEBOOK

MARTHA STEWART: GREEDY, BUT NOT CORPORATE

STEWART LITTLE

LAST FRIDAY, A JURY CONVICTED Martha Stewart of lying about a 2001 stock sale in which her broker gave her insider information on pharmaceutical maker ImClone. The next day, *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution* called Stewart the "highest-profile figure in a procession of corporate scandals that emerged after the tech stock boom-and-bust of the 1990s." The *Los Angeles Times* described her as "the first major figure convicted by a jury in the wave of corporate scandals." And *The New York Times* called her "the latest and most prominent executive to be convicted since a wave of corporate scandals unfolded with the collapse of Enron." Reading the papers, you could be forgiven for thinking that the queen of American homemakers had done as much damage to American investors as WorldCom bad boys Bernie Ebbers and Scott Sullivan.

That's ludicrous. Stewart may be both a corporate executive and guilty of wrongdoing, but that doesn't mean she's guilty of *corporate* wrongdoing. Her position at the top of a company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, is relevant only inasmuch as it made her a power client for whom her broker apparently believed that breaking the rules was acceptable. By taking advantage of insider information, she was acting as an individual, not an executive. Which is why her case is so different from those of Ebbers, Jeff Skilling, or John Rigas, who allegedly used their positions atop WorldCom, Enron, and Adelphia to construct elaborate frauds that enriched not only themselves but their fellow executives—at a steep cost to lower-level employees and the investing public, not to mention the thousands who depended on the services their companies provided. Those cases point to something deeply wrong with both American corporate ethics and the system designed to enforce them. The Stewart case simply reinforces what we already know: Some people are greedy.

Martha Stewart

Thanks to the media attention surrounding the Stewart verdict, however, readers may inaccurately conclude that corporate justice, rather than celebrity justice, has been served in this case. And, given the public's low tolerance for complex accounting scandals, they might well tune out coverage of the upcoming Ebbers and Sullivan trials. Which is too bad, because, if they paid attention, they might notice that the feds have constructed a relatively weak case against Ebbers and that Sullivan has already agreed to cooperate, guaranteeing him a lighter sentence. It's the media's job to provide such scrutiny and to explain to the public why such cases are important. By muddling the meaning of the Stewart case, they've made that job a lot harder. And that's not a Good Thing.

CONTESTED SELECTION

THIS WEEK, *THE NEW YORK TIMES* and *The Boston Globe* claimed to have struck a blow against the conventional wisdom. After each early primary, political reporters and Democratic Party flacks had hailed heavy voter turnout as a good omen for November. But, now that the *Times* and *Globe* had hard numbers in hand, they forcefully knocked down those claims. As the *Times* headline blared, "DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES' TURNOUT IS SAID NOT TO HAVE BEEN STRONG." Close observers of politics, however, should have immediately recognized a flaw in the story: The reporters cited a study that originated with Curtis Gans, director of the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate. Gans has made a career of publishing reports decrying the decline in voter turnout and the decrepit condition of our democracy. And, sure enough, analyzing this political season, Gans argued that "disinterest in these primaries ... augurs ill for the American political system."

Fortunately for the Republic, Gans can only make such dire predictions because he uses bunk numbers. In 2001, for instance, the political scientists Michael McDonald and Samuel Popkin published a decisive refutation of Gans's analyses, arguing that his statistics rely on sleight of hand. The base population Gans uses includes a growing population of unnaturalized immigrants and felons who can't legally cast ballots. When McDonald and Popkin removed these noneligibles from the model, they found that turnout has hardly spiraled downward in the postwar era. "[T]he turnout rate is not in free fall," they argued in a *Washington Post* op-ed in 2000. This year, again, Gans's claims are full of holes. For starters, his study doesn't include the Iowa caucuses, where 125,000 voters showed up, tying the 1988 turnout. And, in the *Times*, he dismissed the high turnouts in Arizona, Delaware, and South Carolina as not significant.

DAVID COWLES

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Those states haven't had many primaries, he argued, so there's no good basis for comparison. But that's culling the evidence rather selectively. South Carolina's turnout rate, for instance, more than doubled from the contested 1992 primary. True, voter turnout was lower in states that held later primaries, but it's also true that, after the February 3 contests, a Kerry nomination was pretty much inevitable. So, unfortunately, was Gans's doom-and-gloom analysis.

FINDERS KEEPERS?

'EDITOR'S NOTE: THE FOLLOWING are highlights of Vice President Dick Cheney's remarks at last night's annual Gridiron dinner. Although the speech is off-the-record, they were obtained by The Daily Standard."—*The Weekly Standard*'s explanation for why its daily website published not-for-publication material on March 7

DEPENDS ON YOUR DEFINITION OF "HIGH-RANKING"

'DESPITE MR. KERRY'S CROCODILE tears about the Republican 'attack machine' and 'smear' campaign, neither the President nor any other high-ranking Republican has so far taken a serious jab at either Mr. Kerry's character or his record."—*Wall Street Journal* editorial, March 5

"[The Democratic presidential candidates are] for tax cuts and against them. For NAFTA and against NAFTA. For the Patriot Act and against the Patriot Act. In favor of liberating Iraq and opposed to it. And that's just one senator from Massachusetts."—President Bush, February 23

YOU DON'T SAY

'STEWART'S CELEBRITY CREATED MAGNET FOR SCRUTINY"—Headline of a front-page "News Analysis" of the Martha Stewart case in *The New York Times*, March 7 ■

TNR.commentary

EASTERBLOGG

GREGG EASTERBROOK

RECORD STUPIDITY: Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and many major news outlets have recently—and ludicrously—bemoaned "near-record gasoline prices." Last week, the national average for regular unleaded was $1.71, while "the record," *USA Today* declared, was $1.74 in August 2003. But all that matters to consumers is inflation-adjusted cost, and, in real dollars, gasoline prices remain about where they have been for most of the postwar era. Oregon State University researchers have determined that the actual U.S. record price for gasoline occurred in 1981, when regular unleaded cost $2.75 in today's money. In other words, current prices are actually 37 percent lower than their true peak.

But wait: Current prices are even lower when you take into account buying power. The average price of gasoline during the 1950s was about $1.80 in today's money—meaning that, during the period enshrined in our collective political nostalgia as Energy Heaven, gasoline cost slightly more in real dollars than the amount now being theatrically bemoaned as a "record" price. But, in the '50s, per capita real income was less than half what it is today. That means that, for the typical American, gasoline cost twice as much, in terms of buying power, as today's gasoline.

Financial numbers of all kinds annually reach "record" levels until you account for inflation and buying power. You'd think major news organizations could remember that.

Campaign Journal

RYAN LIZZA

LOW POINT: The March 9 *Washington Post* poll had lots of bad news for Bush. The top line numbers show Kerry leading by nine points (53 to 44 percent) in a two-man race against Bush and by four points (48 to 44 percent) when Nader is added.

Bush broke lots of records in this poll. The percentage of Americans who "strongly disapprove" of Bush's job performance is at an all-time high of 36 percent. Issue by issue, disapproval is also at a record high on the federal budget deficit (65 percent), the economy (59 percent), Social Security (55 percent), the situation in Iraq (53 percent), education (45 percent), and the campaign against terrorism (34 percent). When asked if Bush is honest and trustworthy, 45 percent of Americans say "no," the highest ever recorded by the poll. Finally, Bush's unfavorability rating is at an all-time high of 46 percent.

But, despite the fact that Bush is starting the general election with the weakest poll numbers ever registered for him, the survey also shows how soft Kerry's support is. Eighty-six percent of Bush's backers say they strongly support him, while only 66 percent of Kerry's backers say they strongly support the senator, meaning Bush has the opportunity to change some minds. Still, there is now clearly an anti-Bush majority prepared to back an acceptable alternative.

IRAQ'D

SPENCER ACKERMAN

WALKBACK: Now that Iraq's provisional constitution has been signed, it's worth wondering what role Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani played in last Friday's walkout by five Shia members of the Governing Council. They had asked that the Kurds not be given a veto over a permanent constitution and that there be a five-person presidency—a step that would have given the Shia much greater power. Initial accounts indicated that Sistani had called for the protest, but, if so, it would represent a leap in political involvement for the cleric, who is endlessly described as belonging to the "quietist" school of Shiism.

Sistani might well have objected to a Kurdish veto, but it's hard to believe he would have advocated much greater executive power for the Shia. His vision for Iraq—on direct elections, for example—has always been couched in terms of what's best for the country as a whole, and he hasn't taken advantage of the many opportunities he has had to stir up ethnic trouble.

Michigan Professor Juan Cole suspects the Governing Council inflated Sistani's role to cover their own ambitions: " The main beneficiaries of a five-man presidency are people like Ahmad Chalabi, who probably could not get selected president, but who want to ensure for themselves some sort of high executive post." I tend to agree. Here's the son of a fellow cleric talking to Reuters: "The religious authorities have made their position clear to the politicians but don't want to interfere directly. They have deep reservations, but also know this interim constitution is a step in the right direction."

Indeed, after two heated days of negotiations, the five Council members abruptly shifted their story and said it was they who had asked Sistani to support their position—not the other way around. Sounds like a failed power grab to me.

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Campaign Journal

Bringing It

BY RYAN LIZZA



This was supposed to be the period where a dangerously underfunded John Kerry was clobbered by George W. Bush's early advertising. Instead, it is Kerry who has knocked Bush off balance.

THE FIRST VOLLEY of the 2004 general election came last Saturday, March 6, four days after John Kerry became the de facto Democratic nominee by driving John Edwards from the race. For three years, the Democrats had responded to President Bush's regular Saturday radio address with a rotating cast of mid-wattage pols. At the height of Bush's popularity, nothing better emphasized the stature gap between the wartime president and his hapless opposition than listening to, say, Debbie Stabenow carp about prescription drugs after a Bush address celebrating the overthrow of the Taliban. But, on Saturday, the Democrats handed over their weekly turn at the microphone to Kerry.

His aides thought hard about what to say. "The first head-to-head thing they had in this campaign was the radio address," says a senior Kerry adviser. "We could have done health care or jobs," issues where Kerry has huge advantages over Bush. Instead, Kerry talked about defense. "In the midst of the war on terror," he said, "no job is more important for a president than the duty of our commander-in-chief to provide for the common defense." Bush, he charged, was undermining America's safety. "Today, our security is being weakened, our military is being overextended, our reserves overstrained, and our allies driven away," Kerry declared. Not many Americans listen to these weekly radio chats, but that was hardly the point. The Kerry campaign was trying to send a message. Says the adviser, "That was a way of saying that we're going to take away the one asset he thinks he is going to have."

The general-election campaign will be a long eight months, and it would be folly to ascribe too much significance to Kerry and Bush's opening skirmishes. But the last week has shown that, once again, the early conventional wisdom about this race was wrong. This spring was supposed to be the period where a dangerously underfunded Kerry pivoted from a bloody primary season into the fist of Bush's early advertising. Instead, it is Kerry who has knocked Bush off balance and taken the lead in most public polls. Kerry's aides are buoyant. Republicans are suddenly panicked. Round one to John Kerry.

THERE ARE THREE reasons Kerry is controlling the debate so far. First, he is playing on Bush's turf. That was the purpose of making the military the subject of his response to the president's radio address. Polls show Kerry with wide leads on the economy, creating jobs, the budget deficit, and health care. With Kerry pressing him to defend his national security record, Bush hasn't had time to start inoculating himself on these issues: Instead of emphasizing the economy or health care, Bush's first ads have tried to shore up what should be his unquestioned strength, his post–September 11 leadership. Kerry, meanwhile, has made some inroads here. A *Washington Post* poll almost one year ago showed a 51-point gap between Bush and the Democrats on the issue of terrorism. This week, the same poll shows Kerry narrowing the gap to 21 points. That's still a chasm, but it is evidence that Kerry has at least begun to chip into Bush's lead.

The sense that Bush is on the defensive is mirrored in the state polling as well. A Gallup survey out this week shows that, in the twelve closest states from the 2000 election (which split evenly, six to Bush and six to Al Gore), Kerry is beating the president by an average of 16 points, 55 to 39 percent. A review of all the state polls released over the last month finds that Bush does not lead in a single state he lost in 2000, while Kerry has early leads in several Bush states, including Florida, Missouri, and New Hampshire.

The second reason the Kerry campaign is starting the general election in a better position than anyone predicted is that it is exhibiting an aggressiveness that has caught the White House off guard. For all the Republican bluster

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Where We Stand

THE **AFT** ON CRITICAL ISSUES

DOING WHAT WORKS

THE LINK BETWEEN SKILLED TEACHERS AND STUDENT SUCCESS



Teacher expertise is one of the most important factors in student achievement. Yet the way we select, prepare, and train teachers often fails to reflect the importance of their role. Fortunately, most teachers do well, but too often, school officials hire individuals who are not adequately prepared to teach, a problem that is especially prevalent in schools with large numbers of poor and minority students. An estimated 6.5 percent of the 200,000 new teachers public schools hire each year are not fully certified. What's more, depending on their discipline, up to a third of public school teachers are teaching subjects in which they didn't major, or minor, when they were in college.

Our nation's public schools need to hire and retain some 200,000 new teachers each year—at a time when fewer graduates are choosing teaching careers. Compounding that challenge is a fast-approaching deadline for schools to meet federally imposed standards for teacher quality or be penalized.

This challenge won't be met without careful planning and policy changes. The good news is that there are steps school officials can take immediately to improve teacher quality.

WHAT WE CAN START DOING NOW

- **Strengthen "student teaching"** For too many teacher candidates, college coursework and student teaching experiences don't provide enough hands-on classroom work with close supervision and constructive feedback. Future teachers need to learn how to handle real classroom situations and challenges before they start teaching.
- **Mentoring and peer review** From the start, teachers need ongoing support from skilled veterans who observe them in the classroom and show them ways to improve their work with students. Teachers want to do well. Mentoring and peer review programs across the country are helping to attract and keep good teachers—and to remove from classrooms teachers whose skills aren't up to the task.
- **Reduce "out of field" teaching** Teachers should teach subjects they know. It's wrong to have an unprepared teacher take over a math or science class because no one trained in that field is available. Financial incentives for current faculty to take courses in subject areas where the school has a staffing shortage can help.
- **Ongoing teacher training** The most successful companies invest in ongoing training and development for their employees, and schools should, too. Professional development in the best and latest techniques helps teachers stay current with their subject areas, learn new teaching methods, and exchange advice and experiences with their colleagues. At the Chicago Teachers Union Quest Center, for example, new and experienced teachers alike benefit from the training they receive from their accomplished colleagues, in terms of both strengthened teacher practice and improved teacher retention.

Teacher quality is one very important factor in student achievement and it is an area in which school districts can make a real and immediate difference.

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Sandra Feldman, President

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about how they expected Kerry to wage a ruthless campaign, the Bush team seemed unprepared for it. Both sides insist that the other campaign is merciless and will do anything to get elected, but it's Kerry's aides who act like they really believe it. "The one thing that we've learned about this White House is they have no shame about what they will say as long as they think it will be effective," says David Wade, Kerry's spokesman. "These are tough, fierce, ruthless adversaries." The White House has governed for three years without strong opposition from either Democrats or a scandal-chasing press, while Kerry's aides already seem battle-hardened. They wonder if the Bush campaign expected them to run a timid and defensive campaign à la Michael Dukakis in 1988, when in fact they've been studying Bill Clinton in 1992. "That was a campaign that believed in the doctrine of rapid response," says Wade, "and this is a campaign that knows you have to fight back and that the best defense is a good offense." Adds a top Kerry aide, "The lesson of Clinton '92 is you just never let up."

BUT THE MOST important reason for Kerry's early success is the simple fact of Bush's recent decline. Asked recently if Kerry's attacks were a big concern, Terry Holt, Bush's campaign spokesman, brushed them off, explaining to me that there were really only two things that could derail Bush: "self-inflicted wounds" or "circumstances beyond our control." Both plague Bush of late. The self-inflicted wounds seem to come with every major move Bush makes. The State of the Union address quickly became a punch line about Martians and steroids. Bush's subsequent appearance on "Meet the Press" was panned across the political spectrum. And a third strike came with the unveiling of his much-hyped TV ads, which the campaign was still defending from criticism about their use of September 11 images a full week after their release.

Still, embarrassing as these missteps have been, the circumstances beyond Bush's control are probably even more worrisome to him. Bush is approaching the point, about six months out from Election Day, where views about the economy harden. (In 1992, remember, his father lost despite the fact that the recession had ended and growth had returned.) And, despite positive signs, such as the signing of a provisional constitution this week, Iraq could reemerge as a problem for Bush at any time should American soldiers be killed or the political situation deteriorate. Add to this a number of slowly percolating stories, any one of which might (or might not) emerge as an administration scandal—the report by the 9/11 Commission, the Supreme Court ruling on Dick Cheney's Energy Task Force documents, the ongoing investigations into the Valerie Plame leak and the GOP theft of Democratic files on the Senate Judiciary Committee, etc.—and Holt's concern is understandable. (Of course, the flip side is that a good "circumstance beyond their control," such as the capture of Osama bin Laden, would give Bush a major boost.) Still, it's ironic that, in a year when the political press has focused largely on the roller-coaster ride of the Democratic primaries, the real story may actually have been happening on the Republican side. "Frankly, Bush's collapse is way more important and dramatic than what happened to [Howard] Dean," says Simon Rosenberg of the New Democrat Network.

The campaign is only beginning, and its first week won't likely tell us much about its ultimate outcome. But the Kerry camp thinks they have laid down a crucial marker. "There is something important about the first encounter and who blinks," says Wade. "I think they've been caught off guard." ■

Washington v. Aristide

Oppo Research

BY JANINE ZACHARIA

AT JANUARY'S SUMMIT of the Americas in Mexico, a gathering of nearly every nation in North and South America, President Bush took his push for democratization to the United States' backyard. "At past summits, we resolved that democracy is the only legitimate form of government in this hemisphere and that the peoples of the Americas have an obligation to promote it and defend it," Bush said. "Our unity and support of democratic institutions, constitutional processes, and basic liberties gives hope and strength to those struggling to preserve their God-given rights, whether in Venezuela, or Haiti, or Bolivia."

Unfortunately, the White House's recent actions don't match its lofty rhetoric. In several countries, the United States has tilted the political playing field against flawed but democratically elected left-wing leaders. Working through government-linked organizations, Washington has funneled money to opponents of former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Latin American presidents, promoting opposition politicians rather than democracy itself. "The people of our hemisphere watched this administration turn its back on democracy and walk out on a democratically elected president," Representative Bob Menendez, ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, said last week. "They watched, and they got the clear messages that this sent: This administration will not stand up for a democratically elected head of state they do not like." Unfortunately, he's right.

U.S. intervention in Latin America is more subtle than it used to be. Overt tactics, such as fomenting a coup (as the United States did in Guatemala in 1954), are no longer ac-

Janine Zacharia is the Washington correspondent for THE JERUSALEM POST.

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ceptable. So it is unlikely Aristide was "kidnapped" by the United States and dragged out of Haiti against his will, as he has alleged. James Dobbins, the Clinton administration special envoy to Haiti from 1994 to 1996, says there is no evidence the United States forcibly removed Aristide. After all, Aristide wrote a resignation letter (which he later claimed, with no evidence, was forged) and, at first, appeared to leave of his own free will.

But the White House, and key congressional Republicans, clearly had no love for Aristide—or for Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, another leftist leader. During the Clinton administration, which returned Aristide to power in 1994, American officials maintained contact with the Aristide government. After the disputed May 2000 elections—won by Aristide's party—direct aid to the Haitian government was halted temporarily because of White House concern about fraud in the election. When it came into office, the Bush administration essentially made the aid cut-off permanent, blocking all direct aid to the Haitian government.

The White House's Haiti decision was not surprising. After all, during the '90s, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had been among the most strident critics of the Clinton administration's decision to restore Aristide to power. (On the Senate floor, Helms once denounced Aristide as a "psychotic.") Helms's chief Haiti adviser was Roger Noriega, now assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, and the man responsible for the administration's Haiti policy. "Roger Noriega has been dedicated to ousting Aristide for many, many years," Robert White, a former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay, told reporters last week. In fact, in 2002, as U.S. envoy to the Organization of American States, Noriega said Washington could not help build democracy in Haiti while Aristide was in power. "When I met with Assistant Secretary Noriega, I got the distinct impression that the [Haiti] policy of this government is regime change," agreed Senator Bill Nelson of Florida at a congressional hearing in February. In recent months, Noriega has worked closely with National Security Council Latin America envoy Otto Reich, who also has strongly denounced Aristide and leftist leaders in Latin America, and who had contacts with some of the opposition forces who tried to overthrow Venezuelan President Chavez two years ago. Before Chavez was briefly deposed, Reich held a series of meetings with anti-Chavez forces. After the coup, Reich seemed to welcome Chavez's overthrow.

The Bush administration has exerted its influence in Haiti by pumping cash into programs that empower political opposition groups while withholding aid for the Aristide government. Much of this cash was distributed through the International Republican Institute (IRI), a Washington-based nonprofit that tries to "advance democracy worldwide." In most of the roughly 50 countries where IRI runs programs, it provides programming to both the ruling party and the opposition. But, in Haiti, programs sponsored by IRI only include opposition groups; with a few minor exceptions, the same holds for Venezuela. In late 2001, the U.S. Agency for International Development, which provides the funding for IRI and similar organizations, convened consultations on how to promote democracy in Haiti. According to an IRI official, there wasn't "a reluctance per se to work with [Aristide's] Lavalas Party." The ruling party, the official said, simply looked strong "and didn't need our help," even though IRI helps both incumbents and challengers in many other countries. Perhaps sensing IRI's wariness, Aristide's party did not reach out to IRI.

Having decided to only steer funding to Aristide's opposition, in December 2001 and again in April 2002 IRI brought nonviolent Haitian opposition leaders to a Miami hotel to assess their needs. Between September 2002 and January 2004, IRI then hosted seven workshops in the Dominican Republic for opposition leaders. The trainings were led by Republican political consultants and even some Republican state representatives and involved seminars on party structure, political communication, and fund-raising. Similarly, earlier this month *The New York Times* reported that Sumate, an opposition group that helped plan the current effort to recall Chavez, received $53,000 from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a group similar to IRI. The *Times* reported that, over the past two years, NED "has funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars" to a spectrum of Venezuelan opposition organizations. (IRI has funded programs for the Venezuelan opposition as well.)

As in Venezuela, the amount of money the Bush administration spent helping the Haitian opposition is relatively small; the total U.S. budget for democracy training in Haiti in 2004 is $2.9 million. But Haiti is the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, and three million dollars is not an insignificant sum there. More important, by not spreading the money around, experts say, the Bush administration sent a message to Haitians that opposition groups alone enjoy America's backing. "This administration continued to provide counsel and moral support to the opposition but ... provided no assistance to the Haitian government," says Dobbins. "The result was a somewhat unbalanced relationship in which they seem to have an intimate relationship only with the opposition." That alone may have led Aristide's opponents to believe that, if they tried to depose Aristide by force, the United States would not stop them.

It turned out they were right. The White House did little to tamp down the violent anti-Aristide rebellion once it began in January. When asked about the crisis erupting in Haiti on February 25, President Bush did not condemn the rebels but simply said, "I have made abundantly clear to the Coast Guard that we will turn back any refugee that attempts to reach our shore." In fact, the White House essentially gave veto power over any political solution to Aristide's opponents: When the rebels rejected a compromise deal proposed by other Caribbean nations, the United States said that Aristide had to leave. The White House showed "it

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will stand idly by as rebels, thugs, and prisoners topple a democratically elected government," Menendez has said.

ONE MIGHT ARGUE that, given Aristide's and Chavez's authoritarian tendencies, undermining them is tantamount to promoting democracy. Yet there is little evidence that the opposition groups that benefit indirectly from U.S. policies have a genuine commitment to democracy. Aristide's opponents include former members of the notoriously brutal Haitian military and several men accused of being drug traffickers. "The [Haitian] opposition ... became just as dependent on criminal elements," Dobbins told the *Baltimore Sun* earlier this month. Meanwhile, the Venezuelan opposition included many former generals.

Robert Pastor, a Haiti expert at American University, says that, because the administration has persisted in supporting one side in Haiti, Venezuela, and Bolivia, "the U.S. has really not developed a pro-democracy policy ... in a matter that would be credible." But the White House seems unlikely to change its strategy. In fact, Chavez could be next in line for U.S. intervention. One Pentagon official told me the Bush administration was now looking closely at the recall in Venezuela, examining whether it was "proceeding the way it's supposed to, ... or has Chavez rendered it impossible to produce a fair, honest result?" If Chavez has meddled with the recall, the official said, "at some point soon we might have to make some decision about what needs to happen" in Venezuela. Sounds familiar. ■

Moscow Dispatch

Secret Society

BY MASHA GESSEN

FOR THE WESTERN press, the good news from Russia just keeps coming. After President Vladimir Putin appointed Mikhail Fradkov as his new prime minister last week, the *Los Angeles Times* gushed about his choice, highlighting Fradkov's history as a trade minister and diplomat, and noting that Fradkov "could help head off increasing friction with Europe over such issues as the war in the separatist republic of Chechnya, Russian troops in Georgia and Moldova, and Russia's failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on global warming." *The New York Times*, in an editorial earlier this month, called Fradkov "a promising choice" who has "been doing what Russia needs to do: reform the administration, get the books in order, combat corruption, halt capital flight and work on Russia's international standing." Only *The Washington Post*, in a piece titled "RUSSIANS' FEARS OF KREMLIN REEMERGE; INFLUENCE OF PUTIN IS DISCERNED BEHIND STRONG-ARM TACTICS," noted that Fradkov's appointment did nothing to alleviate the fear of government repression spreading through Russia, a fear that has driven 33,000 Russians to seek political asylum in industrialized countries in the past year.

What do these refugees know that both *Times* do not? For one thing, they may know who Mikhail Fradkov is. Both *The New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times* called him "a little-known bureaucrat," and the BBC went so far as to call him an "enigma"—clichés that have been the stock and trade of Russia coverage since Putin became president four years ago. When the Western media calls Putin "enigmatic," it implies that his administration has few consistent principles, no governing ideology, and unclear political loyalties.

That's wrong. While Putin doesn't have a political ideology, he does govern according to a clear set of beliefs about how things should be. Putin, who once served in the KGB, has stacked the Kremlin with former KGB officers. Unsurprisingly, these appointees believe in government dominance over business, civil liberties, and nearly every other aspect of Russian society. Their ascent has been matched by increasingly militant political rhetoric—toward Chechnya or anyone who runs afoul of the Kremlin—and correspondingly heavy-handed action. And, while Fradkov may be portrayed in the West as a "reformer"—in part because he speaks English and Spanish, and has lived in Western Europe as a diplomat—he has close KGB links. And he has already shown himself to be as thuggish as the other former secret police in Putin's Cabinet.

FRADKOV IS NOT as powerful as some of Putin's other Cabinet appointees with KGB backgrounds, such as Viktor Ivanov, the deputy head of the presidential administration. But Fradkov has been a civil servant his entire adult life, and he has held a series of Cabinet-level posts in the last dozen years. He is, in other words, very much a known quantity—to anyone who cares to look into his past. In fact, Fradkov appears to have had a classic KGB career. At age 23, he was posted to India as an economic adviser working for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. During the Soviet period, this organization existed in part to procure hard currency and put it into the coffers of Communist organizations overseas—activities illegal under most countries' laws. Since the work was highly sensitive, and staffers lived abroad for long stretches of time, they were required to cooperate to some extent with the KGB. In Fradkov's case, the cooperation appears to have been close. There is a year missing from his resumé—between finishing college and going to India—that, in Soviet times, was a telltale sign of KGB training. Nor, during Soviet times, was there any chance that someone of his age and background—he hailed from a provincial Jewish family with no particular

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party connections—would have received such a lucrative posting if he was not in fact working for the KGB.

Like Putin's other KGB-associated appointees, Fradkov, who is intensely inarticulate in public, combines a love of undercover operations with a penchant for strong-arm tactics. Between 2001 and 2003, Fradkov headed the Russian tax police, where he obtained a reputation as a "reformer" because he tried to close tax loopholes. Yet, under his leadership, the agency adopted a mafioso enforcement style. Tax raids featured masked policemen, and businessmen were forced to lie facedown on the floor while their offices were searched. In early 2003, Fradkov even issued an order directing tax police officers to gather intelligence on "potential violators," a category so broad it defied definition.

In his public statements since being appointed, Prime Minister Fradkov has promised to fight corruption. Yet anyone familiar with Fradkov's past will shudder at the thought. In the past, Fradkov has used the anti-corruption mantle to strike fear into enemies. When he ran the tax police, Fradkov investigated many prominent businessmen, and the tax police turned into a gang of marauding bandits. Worse, when he worked for the Foreign Trade Ministry in the mid-'90s, Fradkov showed that he was not immune to graft himself: In 1995, Russian newspapers reported that he was at the center of a scandal involving the theft of nearly five billion rubles (more than a million dollars) from the Foreign Trade Ministry's budget, which was distributed to ministry employees, including Fradkov himself. The investigation into the scandal was halted when many documents conveniently burned. What's more, the new Prime Minister Fradkov has influential friends, who may try to use his power to settle their own scores. For example, he has close ties to Peter Aven, one of Russia's most powerful bankers. And, though *The New York Times* praised Fradkov because he "was not involved in the corrupt privatization schemes under Boris Yeltsin," in actuality Fradkov was a key player in privatizing numerous companies in 1994 and 1995.

Fradkov's appointment also coincides with a reorganization of the government eerily reminiscent of Soviet times. Fradkov and Putin are abolishing nearly half the Cabinet portfolios and replacing them with figurehead ministers responsible for huge areas of policy. Actual policy will be made by largely invisible deputies unaccountable to the public. What's more, the Cabinet will essentially be run from the Kremlin: Putin has announced that he is taking personal control of the Foreign Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and several others. Even social and economic policy, supposedly Fradkov's brief, will be managed by the Kremlin: Putin is sending down an aide to take control.

Fradkov's appointment also contains a chilling message about the future of Russian politics. Putin dismissed his former prime minister and named Fradkov just three weeks



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before a presidential election—a strange move, since it behooves a candidate, even an incumbent assured of victory, to act as though the election results are not preordained. And the law requires that the government resign right after the election, so Putin will have to renominate Fradkov literally days after his confirmation by parliament. The dismissal and appointment showed that Putin no longer even pretends that he could lose office, that he is no longer willing to observe the normal etiquette of the electoral process. The reshuffle is also intended to show that Putin is a man of action. One of the weird but consistent features of Putin's popularity is that Russians are generally unhappy with their lives and with the government's policies. But polls show that they just love Putin. To ensure that this love continues to flower, someone in government has to be ritually sacrificed on occasion. In the long run, however, Putin is sacrificing all of Russia. ■

Job loss isn't Bush's fault.

Whose Loss?

BY NOAM SCHEIBER

JOHN EDWARDS MAY have been the first to recognize the potency of job loss as an issue in the 2004 election cycle, but John Kerry has now firmly made it his own. "Dick Cheney went on TV and said, 'If we had John Kerry's tax policies, we wouldn't have had the job growth we've had in the country right now,'" Kerry told a crowd in New Orleans last Friday, amid news that January had brought a mere 21,000 new jobs, far fewer than the 125,000 jobs economists had expected. "I came here to say today, 'You're darn right, Mister Vice President. We'd have had real job growth; Americans would be working.'"

Listening to Kerry, you almost get the impression that George W. Bush personally scrolls through corporate payrolls looking for vulnerable people to throw out of work. "I think, when you're seven million jobs in the hole, step number one is pretty simple: Stop digging," Kerry thundered in Ohio last month. By this logic, all the country needs is a president more sympathetic to the plight of the common man and we could instantly reverse the recent hemorrhaging of jobs. Alas, it's not so simple. As incompetent as Bush may be at managing the economy, he deserves little if any responsibility for the millions of jobs lost during his term. Nor is there much Kerry or any other Democrat could have done to reverse the trend had they been in office instead.

CALL IT COSMIC justice for the Florida recount or a genetic predisposition toward economic bad luck. But, whatever you call it, you have to acknowledge that the deck was pretty much stacked against Bush on the jobs issue from the day he entered office. Just as American businesses over-invested in computers and sophisticated factory machines during the bubble years of the late '90s, they also over-invested in labor. There is some debate among mainstream economists over the lowest unemployment rate that can be sustained without causing inflation. (Companies must bid up wages when employees become too scarce.) Most economists put the sustainable unemployment level (known as the NAIRU, or non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, for sticklers) somewhere in the low 5 percent range. But, even if you're optimistic and put it slightly below that, the economy would still have needed to shed between a million and a million and a half jobs from its late 2000 unemployment rate of 3.9 percent. Of course, the economy has actually lost, on net, many more jobs than that—some 2.2 million since early 2001, according to the Labor Department's payroll survey, historically the most reliable measure of employment. But, even blaming Bush for the million-plus additional lost jobs strains economic logic.

At the most abstract level, there are two things that determine short-term employment growth: the rate of growth of the overall economy, which affects job growth positively (the better the economy, the more new jobs), and the rate of productivity growth, which affects job growth negatively (the higher productivity, the fewer new jobs). This, in turn, means there are two possible explanations for a period of subpar job growth. First, the economy can be in the tank, in which case companies aren't hiring because there isn't much demand for their products. Second, the economy can be healthy, but companies are getting more production out of their existing employees. Both of these scenarios have played out over the last few years.

During the recession, which officially lasted from March to November 2001, the economy was shrinking, and there was little need to do much hiring. Then, even after the recession ended, the first year and a half or so of the recovery proved incredibly lackluster, thanks to a range of factors—excess capacity left over from the bubble years, fallout from the September 11 attacks and the corporate scandals, anxiety over a likely war with Iraq. Not only did these "shocks" act as a drag on economic growth; they acted as a particular drag on hiring. "It's been quite clear from the behavior of the labor market how important these shocks have been," says Ethan Harris, Lehman Brothers' chief economist.

Critics will respond that, even setting aside these shocks, the Bush administration still deserves at least part of the blame for the economy's weakness during this time. Liberals in Congress and at think tanks like the Economic Policy Institute offer three basic critiques: that the Bushies should have targeted the bulk of their tax cuts toward the working poor and middle class, who would have been more likely to spend their tax savings than more affluent beneficiaries; that more of the tax cut's benefits should have been delivered in the short-term rather than over five or ten years; and that the administration should have sent more help to the states,

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which were forced to cut spending and raise taxes even as the federal government was doing the opposite.

But, of these three criticisms, only the last one really holds water, at least as far as stimulating the economy is concerned. First, there is increasing evidence that affluent people spend a higher proportion of their income than economic models have traditionally predicted. And, Democrats' complaints about back-loading notwithstanding, the tax cuts appear to have provided plenty of stimulus when it counted. In all, according to Stephen Roach, Morgan Stanley's chief global economist, the 2003 tax cut has provided about 1.5 percentage points of economic growth, which amounts to about $150 billion in our roughly $10 trillion economy. (By comparison, the economy grew by about 3.1 percent overall last year.) Meanwhile, though the states did suck some of that stimulus out of the economy, the effect was probably far overshadowed by the effect of the war. Though (as mentioned above) war-related anxiety probably hurt the economy prior to the invasion, Roach estimates that the tens of billions of federal dollars spent on the war and reconstruction could be credited with almost another 1 percentage point of economic growth.

The broader point is that almost no serious economist argues that the economy has lacked for stimulus during the last three years. Between the tax cuts, additional spending, the falling dollar (which makes U.S. exports more attractive abroad), and—perhaps most important—the Fed's historically low interest rates, the concern, if anything, has been that the Bushies and the Fed have done too much. "I think, combined, it was a Herculean effort," says economist Lakshman Achuthan of the Economic Cycle Research Institute. "We've never seen this kind of stimulus." Even Alan Greenspan, no foe of tax cuts, worried during the winter of 2003 that the latest round of tax-cutting might be overdoing it, stimulus-wise.

WHICH BRINGS US to the second way the Bush administration might have failed the American worker: the inability to convert economic growth into jobs. With the war and the corporate scandals behind us, the excesses of the '90s finally getting worked off, and two and a half years' worth of stimulus kicking in, the economy rebounded nicely in the second half of last year, growing at roughly a 6 percent rate. The problem from the standpoint of workers was that large productivity increases—some of them made possible by technology, some made possible by outsourcing—have rendered new hires unnecessary. Over the last two years, productivity has increased at a torrid 4.5 percent rate on average.

But, pace Edwards and Kerry, this is good news, not bad news. The only drawback to increased productivity takes place in the very short run, when it slows job growth. In the long run, rising productivity is what improves our standard of living. As Berkeley economist Brad DeLong has pointed out, if the productivity of our labor force grows by 1.2 percent per year, it takes about 60 years for the income of the average American to double. If, by contrast, productivity grows by 3 percent per year, it takes only 25 years. And, ultimately, more income implies more economic growth and, therefore, more jobs. Which is to say, trying to put the kibosh on productivity growth in order to generate a few token jobs today would be utterly self-defeating. Joking about ways in which the government could conceivably accomplish that, former Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence Meyer suggests, "We could cut out kindergarten. We could say no more school beyond seven years. I think we could do it if we tried."

Actually, even that's not clear. While we could certainly make American workers less productive, there probably isn't much we can do to prevent U.S. companies from outsourcing work to cheaper locales, short of making it against the law. (Outsourcing work abroad effectively increases productivity by increasing the amount of output an economy can produce with the same amount of resources. Trade has a similar effect.) Kerry has put forth a series of proposals intended to keep manufacturing work in the United States—closing tax loopholes that reward outsourcing, providing tax credits to encourage domestic manufacturing. But the effect of these proposals would be marginal. As long as, say, Mexican autoworkers make about one-fifth of what American autoworkers make, saving a few thousand dollars on payroll taxes isn't going to make much difference.

OF COURSE, JUST because you can excuse the administration's record on job growth doesn't mean you can excuse its overall economic agenda. Even though the Bush tax cuts have succeeded at stimulating the economy, they've done so at enormous (and largely unnecessary) long-term cost. The large deficits created by such K Street goodies as a cut in the tax on dividend income and the (longer-term) lowering of top marginal income tax rates will almost certainly drive up interest rates once the economy sees a few quarters of growth. That could choke off today's healthy expansion not long after it started. Likewise, even if tax cuts that primarily benefit the affluent don't turn out to be appreciably less effective at stimulating the economy than tax cuts that primarily benefit the working poor, they're clearly less defensible morally. And, of course, the administration certainly hasn't done itself any favors on the jobs issue—selling its repeated tax cuts as job-creation plans when they were intended as long-term efforts to starve the government of revenue and lighten the tax burden on the wealthy.

But the idea that correcting any of these deficiencies would have saved a significant number of jobs over the past few years is far-fetched at best. I have no problem with Kerry scoring political points on the jobs issue if it helps elect an administration that cares about the long-term consequences of its economic policies. But, if Kerry seriously thinks he can influence the pace of short-term job growth any better than Bush, then he is sorely mistaken. ■

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Capitalism with a Democratic face.

Bull Run

BY ELIOT SPITZER AND ANDREW G. CELLI JR.

Contrary to what the Bush administration argues, government does have a role to play in the free market—not in keeping capitalism in check, but in keeping it healthy.

WE ARE TOLD we live in the New Economy, an economy of computers and fiber-optic cables, capital without borders, and competition on a global scale. This is mature market capitalism, and its promise for human advancement—when combined with democracy and individual freedom—is rightly touted at every turn. But, if our economy is a creature of the twenty-first century, our thinking about government's role in the economy is mired in the nineteenth.

Two essentially opposite viewpoints dominate today's debate. On one side are those who see market capitalism, loosely regulated and unencumbered by the artificial interventions of government, as perfection itself. They argue: Leave the markets alone, let them work, and efficiency, choice, and progress will follow. On the other side are those who argue that, as miraculous as the capitalist experiment has proved to be, free markets cannot be left unchecked. To maintain a just and equitable society, they say, markets must be protected from their natural tendency toward excesses that lead to monopolies and unfairness. In this scheme, government's role is to put the brakes on capitalism and to protect the public from market forces through its power to tax and regulate.

This conflict has often been reduced to caricature—heartless laissez-faire capitalists versus meddling government bureaucrats. But this characterization presents a false choice. If there is one lesson that can be gleaned from the New Economy, it is that the government's proper role is neither that of passive spectator nor lion tamer. The proper role of government is as market facilitator. Government should act to ensure that markets run cleanly as well as smoothly. It should prevent market failures and right them when they occur. And it should ensure that markets uphold the broad values of our culture rather than debase them. In this vision, government action is necessary for free markets to work as they are intended—in an open, competitive, and fair manner. In this vision, government helps to create, maintain, and expand competition, so the system as a whole can do what it does best: generate and broadly distribute wealth.

Where government has retreated from these core responsibilities, economic dislocation and decay have followed. Three recent examples make the point. We have chosen them not because they are the only or even the best available but because they reflect our practical experience over the past five years in New York state and because they illustrate three distinct rationales for market intervention: to enforce the rules to deal with market failures, and to up-

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ALEX NABAUM

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hold core American values. They show that the Bush administration's economic approach, while veiled in the rhetoric of free markets, actually subverts them. True free-marketers understand that free markets operate according to principles that must be enforced. But President George W. Bush has abdicated his responsibility to protect our markets, leaving a vacuum in which market failures are ignored or chalked up to "natural forces" and the economy suffers shocks that could have been avoided or corrected by careful government intervention. By advocating smart government action and shifting the rhetorical paradigm, Democrats can provide voters with a coherent, pro-market justification for the policy objectives we share. It's good policy and good politics at the same time.

GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN effective and well-received when it has acted to preserve (or restore) confidence in the fairness of the market itself. At a basic level, for a market to be truly free and efficient and have the full confidence of its participants, two things are required: integrity and transparency.

Integrity, in this context, is the idea that actors in the marketplace are what they purport to be: that those who claim to offer independent advice and analysis are not tainted by conflicts of interest; that those who are entrusted with protecting shareholders do so, rather than enriching themselves at shareholders' expenses; and that those who, by virtue of their wealth, power, or access, may be positioned to violate the rules do not. In a system where there is not, and cannot be, a cop on every metaphorical street corner, we rely on this integrity to give us confidence that the system is fair and genuinely competitive.

Just as actors must be what they claim to be, information in a free market must be accurate and truthful, freely flowing, disseminated in a timely way, and available to all. Transparency—implemented through disclosure requirements, institutional barriers to abuse, or widely accepted rules of conduct—is what makes meaningful choice possible. And choice by all actors in a rational market—be they investors or consumers, CEOs or shopkeepers—is what creates the competitive pressures that make the market more efficient and create wealth for us all.

Government is the institution best-suited to protect against corruption and abuse and to ensure that the economic playing field is level. But, in the 1990s, Wall Street experienced what can only be described as the "perfect storm" of government failure. It began with the consolidation of the financial-services sector—permitted by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, a Depression-era statute requiring that commercial and investment banking be separated. The result was the formation of vast full-service enterprises that brought together many potentially conflicting lines of business, including commercial banking, investment banking, stock analysis, and retail brokerage. At the same time, we democratized the marketplace by (wisely) encouraging the American public at large to invest in the capital markets. The interface between mega-institutions and small investors was fraught with risk—risk met by a regulatory void. Indeed, Harvey Pitt, the first Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chair appointed by Bush, is a former industry lobbyist who promised the financial sector a "kinder, gentler SEC," an approach that led to a total breakdown in market enforcement. From Tyco to Enron to mutual funds to analyst compensation, the SEC simply was not attentive to the structural failures that were widely known to industry insiders.

With protections against conflicts of interest severely hobbled, integrity and transparency were soon sacrificed. As a result, research analysts whose compensation and career prospects depended upon the fortunes of their investment-banking partners pushed information about companies that was not just "imperfect," but false. In one infamous example, Merrill Lynch analyst Henry Blodget simultaneously helped pitch banking business to InfoSpace, a Web search company, and hyped the stock to investors, all the while telling his co-workers that the stock was a "piece of junk." In relying on corrupted advice like this, investors invested, corporate executives and investment bankers got rich, and companies that should have been market losers actually "succeeded."

But that success, which took the form of skyrocketing stock prices, options values, and compensation packages for corporate executives, was necessarily short-lived. The market had its revenge, as artificially pumped-up companies were unable to compete over the long term. Their business models failed and their stock prices plummeted. And yet abuses continued. Despite WorldCom's sinking fortunes, Citigroup analyst Jack Grubman kept promoting the stock, all the while receiving compensation that resulted from WorldCom's banking business with Citigroup. But, ultimately, he couldn't keep reality from catching up to WorldCom: Its share price dropped from $60 to 20 cents, wiping out $100 billion in market value.

The real victims were the companies' employees, the investing public, and the market itself. Not only had the public confidence essential to market performance been squandered, but the companies into which huge amounts of capital had been funneled were, from a long-term perspective, the wrong ones. Inefficient, unsound, and simply undeserving, these businesses failed to create meaningful jobs, growth, or lasting wealth. Couple these structural failures with the impact of other corporate scandals—such as Enron, Tyco, and Adelphia—and the result was grim. When the bubble burst in the late '90s, and the truth about overhyped companies came to light, stunned investors experienced the biggest drop in the S&P Index since the 1987 market crash—a drop with profound ripple effects throughout the national economy. A recession that was perhaps inevitable was deepened, and individuals who had set aside assets for education or retirement suddenly found these assets diminished or wiped out entirely.

So much had gone wrong in so short a time that govern-

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ment's ability to right the economy was limited. That said, the forceful reassertion of government's role as facilitator of the twin values of integrity and transparency has contributed powerfully to a sense that we are beginning to put our national economic house in order. With the acceptance of industry-wide codes of conduct by financial-services companies, new and more stringent disclosure and certification requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the aggressive policing of segments of the marketplace, the decline in investor confidence has been halted and perhaps even reversed.

GOVERNMENT CAN ALSO help facilitate the smooth functioning of markets when they are unable to appropriately distribute costs. The burdens of pollution provide a classic example. Where the market finds itself unable to allocate pollution costs efficiently and fairly, and where the federal government refuses to act, the intervention of others, including state governments like New York's, has become necessary.

Take air pollution in the Northeast caused by coal-burning power plants in the Midwest. Corporate players, acting in their rational self-interest, have failed to bear or equitably spread the costs associated with their activity. Instead, they have shifted those costs to others, for whom there is no market recourse. In this case, the costs were acid rain and airborne pollutants, and their devastating effects on the environment and human health—not in the Midwest, where the plants generate and sell their energy, but hundreds of miles downwind, in the Northeast. Plant owners had purposely built smokestacks tall enough that pollutants would fall not on their consumers or those nearby but, quite literally, into someone else's backyard. The costs have been dear. Thousands of New York children suffer from asthma that is at least partially attributable to pollution sent East from power plants in states like Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia. And even the Bush administration's Environmental Protection Agency admits that, in New York's Adirondack Mountains, hundreds of lakes have acidity levels that could kill off certain aquatic species.

In a perfectly functioning market, the costs imposed by this conduct would be borne either by the producer in the form of reduced profits or by the consumer in the form of higher prices. Such costs would not be dumped on the doorstep of those who don't benefit from cheap Midwestern energy. But that is precisely what is happening: Northeasterners have been left holding the bag, and the market alone offers them no way to respond. They are stuck—unless and until government intervenes.

Alas, the Bush administration has refused to do that. Even as it spouts the rhetoric of free-market efficiency, the White House has allowed the polluters to avoid bearing the economic and health-related costs they have imposed. It has tried to reverse a long-standing interpretation of Clean Air Act regulations, which require power plants and other industrial facilities to install modern pollution controls when they are upgraded. This shift in environmental policy represents an abandonment of the market principle that costs should be borne by those who consume or pay for the product—an abandonment driven by a desire to benefit the energy industry. Indeed, the connection between administration policy and interest-group politics is direct and explicit: The shift in the Clean Air Act's interpretation—undertaken to protect Midwestern polluters from having to make expensive upgrades—grew directly out of Vice President Dick Cheney's industry-dominated Energy Task Force, through which energy producers effectively dictated the very policies that are supposed to regulate them.

Left with no other choice, the states and citizens suffering from Midwest-generated pollution have gone to court and successfully stopped the administration's attempted policy change. The point of this effort is neither to limit the availability of cheap energy to Midwest consumers, nor to shift the costs to them simply for the sake of doing so. Rather, it is to ensure, as an efficient market must, that the costs are borne by the parties responsible. Only by placing the costs where they belong can the market system as a whole assess whether the product is being efficiently created and appropriately priced vis-à-vis potential competitors. That is when the market, freed from its own failures, really works.

LASTLY, OUR COMMITMENT to market capitalism cannot obscure one glaring and immutable fact: that, in a number of important ways, an unregulated market does not safeguard certain core American values. That's why our government—with broad bipartisan support—has instituted child-labor laws, minimum wage laws, anti-discrimination laws, and certain safety net protections designed to ensure that people do not fall below a basic level of sustenance. There is little debate today about the value of these measures. They are, in essence, what we are all about. Child labor is not forbidden in this country because it is inefficient (although it is); it is forbidden because it is wrong.

Unfortunately, our belief in the importance of equal opportunity and nondiscrimination is too often forgotten when it comes to the debate over whether and how to police the market for home mortgages. In poor and working-class communities across the nation, predatory mortgage lending has become a new scourge. Predatory lending is the practice of imposing inflated interest rates, fees, charges, and other onerous terms on home mortgage loans—not because the imperatives of the market require them, but because the lender has found a way to get away with them. These loans (which are often sold as refinance or home-improvement mechanisms) are foisted on borrowers who have no realistic ability to repay them and who face the loss of their hard-won home equity when the all-but-inevitable default and foreclosure occurs. When lenders systematically target certain low-income communities for loans of this sort, as they often do, the result is more insidious. Costs are

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imposed and burdens inflicted in a manner and to a degree that is discriminatory by race.

On the surface, predatory lenders are doing nothing more than seizing a "market opportunity" for refinancing or home-improvement loans in lower-income communities. To be sure, such communities desperately need credit. And it stands to reason that the prices and terms will be less favorable to borrowers whose financial circumstances are troubled or limited. In this sense, predatory loans are the natural outcome of a competitive market. In a policy debate bereft of values, this market rationale becomes a value unto itself—and values like equal opportunity disappear.

But, in our system, the market is there to serve our values, not the other way around. As study after study has shown, the overwhelming majority of people who fall prey to predatory loans would be better off with no loan at all. Moreover, borrowers in this category often bear the same or similar financial characteristics—income levels, creditworthiness, ability and willingness to repay—as their counterparts in the prime market. As a matter of economics, they actually qualify for good loans at good rates. What distinguishes them from borrowers who get credit at the right price, on the right terms, is their actual and perceived lack of options, their limited financial savvy, and, too often, the color of their skin—and sometimes their age or gender.

For a society devoted to fairness and nondiscrimination—as well as the quintessentially American goal of homeownership—the prices, terms, and overall economic impact that we see in predatory home mortgage loans cannot be justified. They are just plain wrong. And, quite apart from the values issue, it is difficult to imagine a less rational, less efficient economic practice than lending of this sort. At the micro-level, it results in a gross misallocation of costs—imposing higher costs than the market requires on those least able to bear them. At the macro-level, it denies lower-cost capital to whole classes of persons who would otherwise qualify for it and to neighborhoods whose economic vitality depends on it.

In these circumstances, government must step in to curb predatory lending and encourage the flow of fairly priced capital to sectors where it is needed and will be well-used. Filling a gap left by federal inaction, state enforcement efforts in this arena have centered on identifying the valid economic criteria considered in mortgage underwriting and compelling lenders to focus on those factors—not on preconceptions, prejudices, or predatory instincts—in determining how to price home mortgage loans. The point is not to protect people from their own bad decisions or, conversely, to guarantee that mortgages be granted to specific persons or groups on specific terms—that would violate the principle of market freedom. The point is to support equal opportunity and to ensure that borrowers are charged rates and fees based upon their status and qualifications as economic actors in the mortgage market, not upon their diminished access or market savvy or their race. In taking action of this sort, state government regulators have upheld core national values and facilitated a fair and open market at the same time.

The Bush administration's reaction has been swift, predictable, and negative. The Treasury Department's Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has issued regulations stripping states of authority to stop predatory lending. It claims that continued state enforcement and regulatory authority will interfere with federal efforts to "regulate" national banks and, of course, with the free market in credit. In truth, the yawning gap between federal rhetoric and federal action in this area suggests a different rationale. Far from seeking to preserve federal prerogatives to regulate or to protect the market from state meddling, these efforts smack of a surrender to banking interests at the expense of market efficiency and the people capitalism is intended to serve.

In a period of severe budget constraints, complex and shifting global entanglements, and a failure of political will, one of our most difficult choices concerns what role government should play in an economy that on the whole has proved astonishingly durable, efficient, and successful. It is a choice we must make as members of a democratic polity, as citizens of a global economy, and as Democrats for whom the old answers no longer satisfy.

President Bush has helped frame that choice. By pursuing policies that are cloaked in free-market rhetoric but fail to facilitate fair markets, he has surrendered to corporate constituencies. He has shown that his party's rhetorical attachment to free markets is just that—a rhetorical attachment and nothing more. And he has done so at a time when it is clear that government nonintervention leads not to market freedom and a rising of all boats but to unrestrained corporatism, gross market distortions, inequitable accumulation of wealth, and economic stasis.

In trying to articulate a more constructive vision—one that is both fiscally and economically sound and that makes sense to the average American voter—Democrats should promote government as a supporter of free markets, not simply a check on them. Government action must be justified by its ability to define, catalyze, and facilitate the market's core mechanisms; to prevent it from faltering under the weight of its own imperfections; and to uphold the underlying values to which the system is, or ought to be, dedicated. It is a vision consistent with trust-busting and other progressive market measures first enunciated early in the last century by Theodore Roosevelt, who said, "We grudge no man a fortune which represents his own power and sagacity, when exercised with entire regard to the welfare of his fellows."

By taking up the mantle of efficient, forward-looking, and market-oriented government action, Democrats can move from being a party that simply opposes Bush's tainted version of laissez-faire to one that advocates for the progress that comes with real market freedom. It is a powerful argument, a true argument, and it is ours for the making. ■

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Gibson's Offering

BY NOW EVERYONE IN THIS world, and possibly in other worlds, has heard about Mel Gibson's new film and has probably read some of the comment. I cannot remember so much prior talk about a film since *Gone With the Wind* in 1938. The casting of that picture became a subject of national concern; there was even, as I recall, a Broadway play on the subject. But that rumpus could not match the storm around **THE PASSION OF THE CHRIST**. After all, here we have the encounter of one of earth's most popular film figures with the figure who, to multitudes, is the Son of God.

THE PASSION OF THE CHRIST
(Newmarket)

In Christian parlance, the Passion signifies the last hours of Jesus's earthly existence, ending in the Crucifixion. In his version, Gibson has concentrated on the torment of Jesus by the Romans on the journey to Golgotha, along the Via Dolorosa. Clearly Gibson wanted to exalt the agony that was suffered for the sake of mankind, to make his viewers aware—or more aware—of the sacrifice that was made for their sins. Much of this film is therefore very bloody—more so, as others have said, than the majority of paintings of the subject. On the way to Golgotha, Roman soldiers flagellate Jesus constantly, first with sticks and then with a species of knout.

There is an oddity here. Gibson has repeatedly answered criticism of various points in his film by saying that he has followed the Gospels, but the Gospels include no such bloody emphasis, through Roman torture or the Stations of the Cross. Matthew says only that Pilate ordered Jesus to be scourged before he was taken to be crucified, that the soldiers crowned him with thorns, spat upon him, then "smote him on the head." That is all. Mark says almost the same thing. Luke does not even say that much. John makes no mention at all of the scourging. The torture that this film's Jesus suffers on his way to Golgotha was supplied by Gibson and his co-writer, Benedict Fitzgerald.

That torture, including Jesus's struggle to carry the cross, raises a question in the minds of us earthlings. Even if we accord to Jesus every quality that Christianity cherishes, it is still difficult to believe that he could have survived Gibson's savage treatment long enough to reach Golgotha. Jesus's physical life was vulnerable, as the Crucifixion proves. Gibson's film makes us wonder how that life could have lasted long enough to make the Crucifixion possible.

Is *The Passion* anti-Semitic? Certainly it is, because the Gospels themselves are anti-Semitic—in the sense of fixing Jewish responsibility for the Crucifixion. Gibson perhaps gets some added relish out of his treatment of Caiaphas and his colleagues and the Jewish mob, but no unsanitized rendition of the story can omit their actions. Historians have added qualifications to the account, and the Second Vatican Council in 1965 stipulated that "what happened in His passion cannot be charged against all the Jews without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today. . . . The Jews should not be presented as rejected or accursed by God, as if this followed from the Holy Scriptures."

Gibson might reply that he was filming the Gospels, not subsequent scholarship nor Vatican statements. But this leads to the question of timing. Permit a secular comparison. David Lean directed a film of *Oliver Twist* with Alec Guinness as Fagin, the villainous Jew who is salient in the story. It was made in 1948, only three years after Hitler's overthrow, and the uproar about it was loud—rightly, I would say. The control of timing is not the equivalent of censorship. (Lean's film was eventually released to the praise that, as film, it deserved.) Our age right now is a curious time in which to promulgate a view that can, in immediacy, countervail Vatican II.

One supervening impression, not factual but atmospheric, is for me inescapable. Before, during, and after seeing *The Passion*, I had and have the sense that, for Gibson, this film is an act of contrition. Here is a man who was brought up and continues to be a devout fundamentalist Catholic, and who has made many, many millions of dollars through films whose violence contradicts the visions of the Prince of Peace. There are Gibson exceptions, of course, including his surprisingly acceptable performance in Zeffirelli's *Hamlet*. (But then *Hamlet* is a very Catholic play.) Still, the $25 million of his own that Gibson is said to have put into this film may be conscience money, and the savagery in the picture may—consciously or not—be Gibson's way of saying that violence is not always valueless.

His directing of the film is workmanlike, the cinematography by Caleb Deschanel is foreseeably fine, the music is foreseeably banal. The dialogue is in Aramaic and Latin, with subtitles. Scholars have criticized the accuracy of using those languages, yet at the least it is a relief to be spared the sound of Bible characters expressing themselves in the diction of our everyday lives. (Note: *The Passion* is having the biggest success that any subtitled film has ever had in this country.) The one performance that really registers is Hristo Naumov Shopov's of Pilate; he gives us the commanding but aloof man who, when Jesus says that he is the truth, can reply coolly, "What is truth?" The best editing touch is the cut away right after this line. Jim Caviezel plays Jesus with more effect as victim than as messiah. (Those who sit through the long closing credits will see that Jesus had a hairstylist.)

Bernard Shaw wrote a substantial exegesis of the four Gospels as a preface to *Androcles and the Lion*, his play about early Christians under Roman sway. In that preface Shaw says:

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The New Testament tells two stories for two different sorts of readers. One is the old story of the achievement of our salvation by the sacrifice and atonement of a divine personage who was barbarously slain and rose again on the third day.... And in this story the political, economic, and moral views of the Christ have no importance.

For the other sort of reader, those views are of high importance. But Gibson is one of the first sort. His film, virtually stripped of Jesus's incandescent views, is little more that a record of one of the thousands of barbarities committed by the Romans in Judea. ■

LEE SIEGEL ON TELEVISION
The Shaman

ONE EVENING LAST OCTOBER, Mark Fisher, a nineteen-year-old student at Fairfield University in Connecticut, who had gone into Manhattan with friends, met a girl in a bar on First Avenue on the Upper East Side, got separated from his group, and was found dead the next morning on a Brooklyn sidewalk, his body wrapped in a yellow blanket, five gunshot wounds in his chest. According to a long article in *The New York Times*, Fisher's case remains unsolved mostly because no one who was with him that night seemed to want to tell the police everything that they knew. This uncertainty was a further affliction on the young victim's parents, Michael and Nancy Fisher, who explained that their son's trip into Manhattan was the first time he had gone there without them. You felt so enraged by their suffering that you searched the article looking for clues on their behalf, or simply to reassure yourself that the world was not such a senseless place that a young person could not venture into it alone, without protection. You put down the paper thinking that you knew who the murderer was; and so you couldn't help wondering what might have happened that night if Mark Fisher had picked up all the clues that you did, not as clues but as warnings of an imminent doom. The ego being the avid entity that it is, you even ended up putting yourself in the poor young man's place, grasping the clues as hints about the future and thereby avoiding his terrible fate, in this way experiencing a catharsis for the pity and the terror that his story had aroused in you in the first place.

Surely, that illusion of control is what lies behind the popularity of a police show such as *CSI*, in which cases are solved by the kind of fancy technology that we have come to depend on—alarm systems, drugs, Blackberries, TiVo—to organize the senseless world more and more in our favor. (We call this rearrangement of the real "customization.") But what kind of mental condition would result if a person could apply his or her powers of detection not to looking into the past but to looking into the future, so that every uncertain portent of trouble became a divination of certain disaster? This would be paranoia; and it would place the detective's pellucid intuition a hairbreadth away from mental illness.

Adrian Monk, the protagonist of what is now television's most original cop show, is both a detective and a seer—excuse me, a victim of obsessive-compulsive disorder, as well as of myriad phobias. He is, in other words, a type of paranoid. Monk worked as a detective for the San Francisco police department until his wife was found murdered in an underground garage. Her murder went unsolved, and Monk grew unhinged. As viewers discovered during this, the show's third season, Monk has had a tendency ever since he was a boy to throw up neurotic defenses against a threatening world. (He never used the swing set his father bought for him when he was eight because the young Monk considered it a "death trap.") With the killing of his wife, Monk's clinical complexity, especially his fantastical vigilance toward germs, intensified to the point where it interfered with his work, and his superiors had to let him go. But he is such a genius at detection that his former boss, Captain Stottlemeyer, keeps him on as a consultant for the most difficult cases, which he investigates with the help of Sharona Fleming, his shrewd, earthy nurse and personal assistant. Naturally, he always solves these cases: there never has been a detective show in which the sleuth does not get his man—or woman. Viewers have to be able to sleep. *Monk*'s complication of the cop show's happy ending, its own innovation in its genre, is that an unsolved crime, the murder of Monk's wife, is what animates everything from its pathos-laden atmosphere to its characters' motivations.

IN A SENSE, *MONK* IS ONE MORE example of a larger development that has been growing stronger and stronger in recent years: the culture's subtle uprising against its own images of perfection. Reality shows, which celebrate the imperfect, the defeated, the humiliated, are one phase of this phenomenon. Television shows and movies in which the hero is a neurotic, or even a semi-paralyzed obsessive-compulsive, express another instance of rebellion. (The revolt of the messes.)

They come in two main varieties. There are OCD heroes such as Jack Nicholson in *As Good as It Gets* and Nicolas Cage in *Matchstick Men*, their forerunners probably going all the way back through Dustin Hoffman in *Rain Man* to Cliff Robertson as the retarded man in *Charly*. (Larry David, though hardly hampered by his neuroses, certainly portrays a neurotic of the first order.) And there is the increasing frequency of movie and television heroes, often criminals of one kind or another, who are in therapy: Robert DeNiro in *Analyze This*, William H. Macy in *Panic*, Pierce Brosnan in *The Thomas Crown Affair*, Tony Soprano. The very effective—and entertaining—purpose of these scenes with a shrink is to bring out the interiority of a character, but these outlaw analysands also conventionalize and even glamorize certain antisocial traits that seem to be growing more socially accepted: selfishness, greed, a total rejection of responsibility toward other people except as instruments of gratification.

But the former group, the autistics and the obsessive-compulsives and the chronic phobics, are different: they offer comfort for our strangeness. These funnily

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and not-so-funnily tortured characters are alone even when they are in public; and they make us grateful that we, unlike them, have not revealed our private, unassimilable peculiarities so openly. We see Hoffman's public display of utter individual strangeness, we watch Nicholson's or Cage's neurotic performance of our deepest anxieties and fears, and we leave the theater buoyant with the thought that our secret selves remain secret and hidden, and that we are in better shape than these people. It is like waking from a repression dream in which we find ourselves, to our horror, sitting at the office, or back in a college or high school classroom, naked or wearing pajamas. We come out of the dream—or we leave the silver screen—relieved: our private rituals of self-protection, our petty and not-so-petty traumas, are still safe inside us, silent and unseen.

YET ADRIAN MONK, WHO IS every bit as wounded as his OCD predecessors, and who also sees a therapist, is in his own category. He does not exhibit pathological behavior. On the contrary: his psyche is still reeling from his wife's murder, and he has no tolerance for the dark, violent side of human behavior. Indeed, unlike the outlaw analysands, he does not really tell his therapist, who sometimes seems as vulnerable and defenseless as Monk, anything significant about his inner life. In one lovely moment, an almost perfect comitragic mixture, Monk's therapist asks him what his sex life with his late wife was like, and Monk, rather than answer, sits in his chair and sings an old torch song. (The show's charm is that it moves from one wildly inventive whimsy to another; if the series has a flaw, it is that it sometimes does not know what to do with itself between whimsies.)

But Monk is also nothing like his OCD precursors, whose maladies are pure negatives that make us feel grateful for our positives, or for the lesser magnitude of our negatives. Monk is sui generis because his curse is his blessing. The condition that is obstructing his wish to be back in the department is also what makes him indispensable to the department. He is a modern-day Philoctetes, the legendary archer of ancient Greek mythology whose prowess with the bow was the reverse side of a festering wound, which emitted such a noxious odor that his fellow soldiers isolated him even as they depended on his gift to save them. The uncannily gifted Monk is the wounded detective; his wound comprises his gift.

This is what makes the show something new. For once, popular culture does not drag the fact of creative genius down—as it did in *A Beautiful Mind* and *Hilary and Jackie*—by making it seem as if some kind of unique suffering is the price that must be paid for great creativity, as if one could be thankful for not being brilliant, or feel that in not "choosing" genius one could avoid suffering. Instead, *Monk* elevates intuitive genius by demonstrating how it elevates and transforms suffering, and by presenting suffering as a condition that everyone shares, no matter what their gifts may or may not be. Nearly everyone on the show has some inflection of Monk-like torment, whether it is Stottlemeyer, who becomes briefly deranged when his own wife is nearly killed in a car accident; or Monk's agoraphobic brother, portrayed in a small tour de force by John Turturro in a guest appearance; or the helpless, naïve upstairs neighbor who is deceived and nearly murdered by a vampish grifter; or Sharona, whose solitary devotion to Monk is something like a renunciation of earthly pleasure. At the core of *Monk* is the unsolved murder of Monk's wife, which colors the show like a metaphor for universal precariousness, for the bruise of mortality on the heart of the world. Or, as Randy Newman sings in the show's theme song, "It's a jungle out there/Disorder and confusion everywhere. . . . /You better pay attention/Or this world we love so much might just kill you."

Into this jungle comes Monk, traversing the thin line between comedy and tragedy, sanity and madness, his gift fueling his illness and his illness stimulating his gift. In the same way, his obsessive-compulsive straightening of crooked objects, his repetition of gestures, and his avoidance of germ-laden surfaces alternates with his alertness to clues: a sundial moved when the perpetrator ran out of his house; a single shoe in a garbage pail that makes him suspect that the other shoe disappeared when its owner was murdered; a case-cracking clue that comes from scouring the newspaper, of all things, for if the world is a jungle, the newspaper is its daily drumbeat. Monk's weakness is his strength: he is preternaturally aware of the external world.

The gentle, almost rueful humor of the show derives from this double motion: just about every incident and scene undulates between absurdity and poignancy. The doubleness is reflected in the extraordinary performance of Tony Shalhoub, who does not play Monk as helpless or nebbishy in the slightest way, but as a shaken yet undefeated worldly man both harassed and reassured by an enigmatic thought or image somewhere in the recesses of his psyche. Shalhoub's Monk goes around half-buried within himself, not so much distracted from the world around him as intensely focused on both the grief and the gift inside him, so that when he is startled out of his mysterious inwardness, which happens constantly, the foolishness of his preoccupied air is immediately absorbed by the intensity of his eccentric attention to the matter at hand. (Turturro, by contrast, instead of playing the agoraphobic brother shifting between his inner world and the world around him, as Monk does, portrays the brother as being lost within himself while interacting with other people at the very same time. Seeing these two masterful character actors work together was a special treat.)

SO THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP of Monk's illness to his gift is embedded in the show's structure and style. A very old resonance hangs about this character. He is "always sickly or morbidly sensitive"; his chosen vocation "allows him to expend [his] nervous force freely"; he exists on "a vital plane that shows him the fundamental data of human existence, that is, solitude, danger, hostility of the surrounding world." I take those descriptions from Mircea Eliade's great book, *Shamanism*. Adrian Monk is the ancient shaman as modern shamus. His strange interlude in his therapist's office recalls "the famous Yakut shaman Tusput (that is, 'fallen from the sky') [who] had been ill at the age of twenty; he began to sing, and felt better."

But, Eliade goes on, "the shaman is not only a sick man; he is, above all, a sick man who has been cured, who has succeeded in curing himself . . . the shamans, for all their apparent likeness to epilep-

Ulysses
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tics and hysterics, show proof of a more than normal nervous constitution; they achieve a degree of concentration beyond the capacity of the profane; they sustain exhausting efforts. . . ." Monk succeeds in curing himself every time he solves a crime by means of his superhuman powers of concentration. If his wife's murder remains unsolved, and he has to try to solve another crime to fend off madness, that is as it should be. Like that aboriginal detective Oedipus, Monk, when he finally solves the riddle of his wife's senseless death, will also solve the riddle of mortality. And that will be his final season. ■

Benny Morris
Politics by Other Means

A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples
By Ilan Pappe
(Cambridge University Press, 333 pp., $22)

Ilan Pappe and I walked a stretch together in uneasy companionship, but we have now parted ways. In the late 1980s and early 1990s we belonged to a group dubbed the "New Historians" of Israel, which also included Avi Shlaim and Tom Segev. This group, contrary to the conspiratorial image projected by our critics, was never a close-knit or monolithic school of intellectuals who plotted together around the table at Friday-night meals. Some of us barely knew one another. Each, in different institutions and different cities and different countries (indeed, only Pappe was on the faculty of an Israeli university), had plied his craft alone and reached his conclusions on his own. But we had all written histories focusing on Israel and Palestine in the 1940s, and they had all appeared, mostly in English, in the late 1980s, and taken together they had shaken the Zionist historiographic establishment and permanently undermined the traditional Zionist narrative of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

In some measure, our histories also undermined the traditional Arab narratives of the conflict (as in my book *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949*, which argued that there had been no Zionist master plan of expulsion and that no systematic policy of expulsion was implemented in 1948). But the thrust of the "New Historiography" was that the century-old conflict was not a straightforward clash between good and evil, that it could not be properly understood in black-and-white terms. Both sides, it was implied if not argued explicitly, had strong claims, and both sides had just grievances. The documentation released in American, British, U.N., and (principally) Israeli archives in the 1980s showed that the Zionist side was not blameless in the conflict, and had sometimes made wrong decisions and indulged in policies and practices that were morally dubious if not downright unethical.

But that was the limit of our consensus. Propagandistic or official historians usually sound the same happy note, and for the same reasons; but dissenting historians usually are polyphonic, and the relationships among them are often troubled, if not flatly unhappy. In the case of Pappe and myself, there was always methodological discord. We both knew that official Zionist historiography was deeply flawed and needed to be reassessed and rewritten on the basis of the evidence that had become available; but we approached history, and the writing of history, from antithetical standpoints. Pappe regarded history through the prism of contemporary politics and consciously wrote history with an eye to serving political ends. My own view was that while historians, as citizens, had political views and aims, their scholarly task was to try to arrive at the truth about a historical event or process, to illuminate the past as objectively and accurately as possible. I believed, and still believe, that there is such a thing as historical truth; that it exists independently of, and can be detached from, the subjectivities of scholars; that it is the historian's duty to try to reach it by using as many and as varied sources as he can. When writing history, the historian should ignore contemporary politics and struggle against his political inclinations as he tries to penetrate the murk of the past. Pappe—and, implicitly, my Zionist critics such as Anita Shapira and Shabtai Teveth—have argued that no one is capable of abandoning his educational, ideological, and political baggage, and that I, too, have been motivated, consciously or subconsciously, by my politics and have reflected (according to Pappe) my solid Zionist convictions or (according to the establishment Zionists) my solid anti-Zionist convictions.

From the first Pappe allowed his politics to hold sway over his history. Initially he was rather restrained. His first book, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–51*, published in 1988, was bland and flat in tone. Perhaps this was due to its origins as a doctoral dissertation; perhaps there were other reasons. In any event, the book avoided blunt iconoclasm, and its innovations are extremely hesitant (unlike Avi Shlaim in his *Collusion Across the Jordan*, published the same year, where it was trenchantly argued that the Yishuv—the Jewish community in Palestine—and the Hashemite rulers of Jordan had colluded to limit their war in 1948 and to nip in the bud the emergence of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, as endorsed by the U.N. partition resolution of November 1947). In his second book, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951*, which appeared in 1992, Pappe allowed his politics more leeway, and they are apparent in his descriptions and in his interpretations; but here, too, there is an effort toward objectivity and accuracy.

In both books Pappe in effect tells his readers: "This is what happened." This is strange, because it directly conflicts with a second major element in his historiographical outlook. Pappe is a proud postmodernist. He believes that there is no such thing as historical truth, only a collection of narratives as numerous as the participants in any given event or process; and each narrative, each perspective, is as valid and legitimate, as true, as the next. Moreover, every narrative is inherently political and, con-

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sciously or not, serves political ends. Each historian is justified in shaping his narrative to promote particular political purposes. Shlomo Aronson, an Israeli political scientist, years ago confronted Pappe with the ultimate problem regarding historical relativism: if all narratives are equally legitimate and there is no historical truth, then the narrative of Holocaust deniers is as valid as that of Holocaust affirmers. Pappe did not offer a persuasive answer, beyond asserting lamely that there exists a large body of indisputable oral testimony affirming that the Holocaust took place.

This broaches the third element in Pappe's historiographical approach: his faith that oral testimony is valuable and valid, and that historians should base their narratives also on the testimony and the memory of witnesses, even decades after the event. But in his new book, as in his previous books, Pappe makes no use at all—or almost no use—of oral testimony, basing his work on primary and secondary written sources. Perhaps he does not really believe in the value of oral history; or perhaps he found the work involved too stressful and time-consuming. In any event, *A History of Modern Palestine* makes no use of oral sources.

My own view is that the historian must base his work on primary written sources, that is, on contemporaneous documents, and must be exceedingly wary of oral history, especially when the events that are being remembered are morally sensitive and politically charged, and occurred many years ago. In the absence of contemporary documents, the historian may occasionally draw upon oral testimony for "color" or a sense of atmosphere, but never to reconstruct what actually happened.

Since so much of the debate about the New Historians is political, I should add that Pappe and I differ not only in our methods but also in our politics. We are both men of the left; but whereas since the late 1960s I have consistently voted Labor or Meretz (a Zionist party to the left of Labor), Pappe, so far as I know, has always voted the Israel Communist Party ticket (under its different names) and has figured repeatedly in the party's list of Knesset candidates. During the past few years Pappe has veered even further leftward. Although his party still advocates a two-state solution, Pappe, like his mentor Edward Said, believes that the only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is a single bi-national state in all of Palestine. (I shall return to this theme.)

SO, AS I SAY, PAPPE AND I ALWAYS were uncomfortable companions in our historical travels. The outbreak, at the end of September 2000, of the current intifada, which I regard as a Palestinian rebellion against the occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip *and* as a political-terroristic assault on Israel's existence (and also as an offshoot of fundamentalist Islam's ongoing assault on the West, in which Israel, unfortunately, figures as a front-line outpost), has, like a giant centrifuge, sent the New Historians spinning toward opposite corners of the political universe. It has separated the anti-Zionist goats from the Zionist sheep, and has accentuated their goatish and sheepish natures. By now it would not be incorrect to call Pappe, as well as Shlaim, an anti-Zionist.

Shlaim's *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, which was published five years ago, is highly critical of the Zionist movement and Israel. Since the start of the current intifada, he has moved steadily to the left—or is it, really, to the right? After all, he shares his anti-Israeli analysis with European neo-fascists and the Islamic jihadists, who openly advocate Israel's destruction in the name of medieval religious values. In an op-ed in the *International Herald Tribune*, Shlaim recently identified with the anti-Semitic British official James Troutbeck, who in June, 1948 described the emergent state of Israel—the one that had just been assaulted by a bevy of Arab states, in defiance of the United Nations Partition Resolution of November, 1947—as a gangster state headed by "an utterly unscrupulous set of leaders." "Today," Shlaim continued, "a similar sense of moral outrage is felt toward the rightist government of Ariel Sharon by people throughout the world."

As for Pappe, the outbreak of the Palestinian revolt has thrust him into academic and political prominence as one of the most outspoken Israeli advocates of a Western boycott of Israel's universities. During the past three years, many pro-Palestinian academics in the West have campaigned (not very successfully) to persuade their universities to cut off contact with their Israeli counterparts and to block research and investment funds from reaching Israel's universities; academic journals have refused to consider or to publish papers by Israelis; a handful of academics have refused to supervise Israeli postgraduate students; and scholars, such as Eugene Rogan, head of the Middle East Centre at Oxford's St. Antony's College, have refused to give lectures in a country governed by Ariel Sharon (presumably they would give lectures in countries run by the likes of Bashar al-Assad and the Ayatollah Khamenei). Pappe has been at the forefront of this effort. It is worth noting that he has not declined to receive wages from a university subsidized by the government whose policies he finds so repulsive. It is also worth noting—here Pappe's logic becomes as flawed as his ethics—that Israel's academic community, the one that has been boycotted by "progressives" in the West, has been in the vanguard of the struggle within Israel to recognize the Palestinians and to reach a political compromise. Israel's universities, as Prime Minister Sharon and Education Minister Limor Livnat regularly recognize, are a mainstay of the Israeli left—and none more so than Haifa University, Pappe's own institution, which has the highest proportion of Arab staff and students (the latter about 20 percent) in Israel.

THIS HAS BEEN PAPPE'S POLITical evolution. *A History of Modern Palestine* is a milestone in his evolution as an historian. He sets out to tell the story of Palestine, which he far less frequently also refers to as the Land of Israel, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, starting with Napoleon's invasion in 1799. It is mainly the story of two peoples—Arabs and Jews—and the interaction between them. Needless to say, a great many pages are devoted to the development of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; but Pappe is at pains, as he tells us in his foreword, not to confine himself to the usual tale of high politics and military history—to the thoughts, the words, and the actions of leaders and generals. In keeping with the politically correct norms of the profession in the contemporary West, he focuses, rather, on "the victims" of "the invasions, occupations, expulsions, discrimination and racism" to which Palestine has been subject. His "heroes," he says, are the "women, children, peasants, workers, ordinary city dwellers, peaceniks, human rights activists"—and his "'villains' ... the arrogant generals, the greedy politicians, the cynical statesmen and the misogynist men."

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It goes almost without saying that Pappe's "victims" are primarily Palestine's Arabs; and all, or almost all, of the "greedy" and the "cynical" are Israelis. In fairness I should add that he does dish up some "misogynist" Palestinians, which is not surprising, given the fact that in Arab and Islamic societies women are by tradition, and often by law, third-class members, who often lack basic rights (in some countries they have no vote, in others they cannot drive cars, and so on). In this respect, Palestinian society is similar to Syrian or Jordanian or Egyptian society, but Pappe papers this over by repeatedly pointing to the continuously "improving" nature of Palestinian women's status at certain points in time—for example, during the two Palestinian intifadas or rebellions against Israel.

Unfortunately, much of what Pappe tries to sell his readers is complete fabrication. In trying to demonstrate women's growing political involvement (and, incidentally, Israeli beastliness), he tells us at one point that "one third of the overall [Palestinian] casualties [in the intifada of 1987–1991] were women," and that "rural women" took "a central role, boldly confronting the army." Among urban women, the proportion of participants in the intifada was even higher, he says. All of this is pure invention. In fact, women constituted about 5 percent of the Palestinian casualties in the first intifada. According to B'Tselem, the Israeli human rights group, eleven hundred Palestinians died at the hands of Israeli army and security personnel during that uprising, and of these, fifty-six were women. Even a cursory glance at film footage of the intifada's riots shows that there were generally no female participants. Women did make an appearance, in small numbers, when pleading with soldiers not to take away arrested men for questioning or when mourning male casualties lying bloodied in the streets; but the women remained remarkably absent from the front lines of the intifada—as they remained, and still remain, absent from the front lines of the current intifada and from the coffee shops of the West Bank and Gaza and other venues where serious matters in the Arab Middle East are discussed, and sometimes decided. Indeed, the recent surge in Islamic fundamentalism in Palestinian society has restricted women even more firmly to hearth and home than was the case before the 1970s. Arafat, with his good sense for public relations, inducted two women—Hanan Ashrawi and Umm Jihad—into the political elite, and Arafat's Fatah has dispatched a handful of female suicide bombers into Israel's cities, but these are token representations of a gender that is essentially disempowered in Palestinian society.

Pappe's periodic insertion of women into the unfolding history is artificial, often absurd, and occasionally without foundation in the sources. He tells us—without offering any source or concrete example—that, following the Young Turks' reformist revolution in Istanbul in 1908, "women [in Palestine] too—but the elite only—began attempting to change their lives.... They organized on a gender basis for the first time." Organized what? He doesn't tell us. And then he adds: "True, only among the Zionist immigrants did women actually work—but even here rhetoric was more abundant than fundamental change in gender relations." In other words, after completely inventing a small feminist revolution among Palestinian women, Pappe, implicitly admitting that nothing of the sort occurred, goes on to assail the Zionists for being no better. The comparison is ridiculous. While women were certainly discriminated against in the workplace and in wages, they have always been full citizens in the Zionist community: they worked in the fields and factories, and they voted for candidates in the Zionist institutions, and they were elected to office. There was nothing comparable in pre-1948 Palestinian Arab society.

Since contemporary historiography apparently requires it, Pappe also injects children into Palestinian social history. Children were always there, of course, but very few sources discuss them, and their impact on the development of Palestine, at least until the intifadas, was probably insubstantial. Yet a politically correct historian worth his spurs cannot exclude them, and so Pappe writes: "It is also possible to say that 1908 marked a new beginning for children in Palestine." What he means by this assertion, or on what he bases it, is never elucidated. Did children suddenly get the vote? Did they get more candy? Did they cry less? Pappe does not say. What he does say is that in the Palestinian Arab school system corporal punishment continued to be the norm through the first half of the twentieth century. He also assumes that, since the Young Turks revolution of 1908 led to an increase in education throughout the Ottoman Empire, there must have been more or better schooling in Palestine too, hence the improvement in the lot of Palestinian children. (But if children were being routinely flogged in the schools, perhaps an increase in schooling—if this in fact occurred—would not necessarily have been a good thing.)

Keeping up with historiographical fashion leads to confusion. Nations and nation-states are retrograde and nasty, almost by definition. At the outset of his book Pappe informs his readers that he intends to "de-nationalize" the history of modern Palestine: a worthy postcolonial or at least postmodern goal. But how does one "de-nationalize" what is essentially a history of a conflict between two nations or peoples? One strategy, seemingly—it is the one Pappe adopts—would be to focus on the economic and social developments in Palestine rather than on the country's politics. But alas, here, too, the historian immediately comes up against the "national" problem, inasmuch as Palestine's two national or ethnic communities essentially developed and grew separately, on national lines. Indeed, by the 1920s they had even spawned two separate "national" economies.

Pappe recognizes the trap almost as soon as the word "de-nationalize" escapes his lips, and in mid-paragraph he dexterously switches gears, telling his readers that, at the least, he intends to "bi-nationalize" his history: unlike many of his predecessors from the Zionist and Arab camps, he will tell Palestine's history from both the Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jewish perspectives. And as the book unfolds, Pappe describes the separate socio-economic and political development of each people at each stage of the country's history before reviewing their interactions.

IT ALL SOUNDS VERY REASONABLE and very tolerant, but in fact *Modern Palestine* is really the story of one people, the Palestinians, who, according to Pappe, unequivocally "turn towards ... nationalism" in 1912 (most historians would place this "turn" a bit later, in the 1920s and 1930s). They are put upon and invaded and subjugated and in part exiled by another people, an invading people, the Zionist Jews. Pappe barely mentions the Jewish habitation of, and rule over, Israel during the thousand years between Joshua's invasion and the crushing of the Bar-Kochba Revolt against Rome in 135 C.E. And while he mentions the causes that during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries

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propelled a fraction of the Jewish people to head for the land in the Levant—anti-Semitic discrimination and violence in the Christian, and later the Muslim, world—Pappe's heart is clearly not in it. He sees the "invasion" and the inevitable clash solely from the Arabs' perspective.

In Pappe's account, there is no faulting the Palestinians for regularly assaulting the Zionist enterprise—in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1936–39, 1947–48, the late 1960s and early 1970s, 1987, and 2000—as there can be no criticizing them for rejecting the various compromises offered by the British, the Americans, the Jews, and the world community in 1937, 1947, 1977–1978, and 2000. The Palestinians are forever victims, the Zionists are forever "brutal colonizers." To his credit, Pappe wears his heart on his sleeve. There is no dissembling here. He even tells us in his acknowledgments—as if he cannot wait to inform his readers of his loyalties—that while his "native tongue is Hebrew," "today [he] converses more and more in Arabic," and his "love of the country [Palestine]" is matched only by his "dislike of the state [Israel]."

TONY JUDT ONCE DESCRIBED in these pages an encounter with students in a graduate seminar in modern European history in an American university:

> After some probing ... [the] students would start to confess that they were actually in a state of panic. To be sure, they could expatiate at length on theories of nationalism. They had mastered the disputes surrounding the nature of fascism or the gendered impact of industrialization. They knew how to "explain" history.... But they had not the foggiest notion what happened, when it happened, who did it, or why.

They simply did not know history. Judt could almost have been describing Ilan Pappe, his colleague in the "one-state solution." Pappe, too, is mortally ignorant of the basic facts of the Israeli-Arab conflict. This book is awash with errors of a quantity and a quality that are not found in serious historiography. And, in Pappe's case, it is not just a matter of sloppiness or indolence in checking facts; the problem goes deeper. It can almost be called a deliberate system of error.

The multiplicity of mistakes on each page is a product of both Pappe's historical methodology and his political proclivities. He seems to admit as much when he writes early on that

> my [pro-Palestinian] bias is apparent despite the desire of my peers that I stick to facts and the 'truth' when reconstructing past realities. I view any such construction as vain and presumptuous. This book is written by one who admits compassion for the colonized not the colonizer; who sympathizes with the occupied not the occupiers; and sides with the workers not the bosses. He feels for women in distress, and has little admiration for men in command.... Mine is a subjective approach....

For those enamored with subjectivity and in thrall to historical relativism, a fact is not a fact and accuracy is unattainable. Why grope for the truth? Narrativity is all. So no reader should be surprised to discover that, according to Pappe, the Stern Gang and the Palmach existed "before the revolt" of 1936 (they were established in 1940–1941); that the Palmach "between 1946 and 1948" fought against the British (in 1947–1948 it did not); that Ben-Gurion in 1929 was chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive (he was chairman from 1935 to 1948); that the Arab Higher Committee was established "by 1934" (it was set up in 1936); that the Arab Legion did not withdraw from Palestine, along with the British, in May, 1948 (most of its units did); that the United Nations' partition proposal of November 29, 1947 had "an equal number of supporters and detractors" (the vote was thirty-three for, thirteen against, and ten abstentions); that the "Jewish forces [were] better equipped" than the invading Arab armies in May, 1948 (they were not, by any stretch of the imagination); that the first truce was "signed" on June 10, 1948 (it was never "signed," and it began on June 11); that in August, 1948 "the successful Israeli campaigns continued, leading to their complete control of Palestine, apart from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" (the Second Truce prevailed during August and September, and warfare was resumed only in mid-October); that the Grand Mufti fled Palestine in 1938 (he left in October, 1937); that the Hebrew University of Jerusalem was "built ... in 1920" (it was founded in 1925 and constructed during the following decades); that Tel Aviv was "founded ... on a Saturday morning in July 1907" (it was in 1909); that the late nineteenth-century Zionist pioneers known as the Biluim established "the first Zionist settlements in Palestine" (they did not), and that they "were led" by Moshe Lilienblum and Leon Pinsker (they were not); that "the Israeli Foreign Office ... translated [U.N. Security Council Resolution 242] into Hebrew in a way that implied that it did not have to withdraw from all the territories it had occupied [in the Six Day War]" (the resolution, in the authoritative English original, speaks of withdrawal "from [occupied] territories," not "the territories" or "all the territories"); that in 1979 there were "1.8 million [Palestinian] refugees" in Lebanon, and in 1982 "well beyond two million" (on both dates the number was around two hundred thousand); that Black September, the Jordanian crackdown against the PLO, took place in 1969 (it was in 1970); that the first settlements in the West Bank were established in 1968 (they were established in 1967); that there was an anti-Hashemite "uprising" in Jordan in 1956 (there were anti-Hashemite or anti–Baghdad Pact riots in Jordan in 1955, but not an uprising); that "the negotiations on Palestine's future produced [during World War I] three documents: the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration" (only the last focused on Palestine's future); that "in September 1918 the north of Palestine was taken quietly [by the British army]" (it was taken in battle, the Battle of Armaggedon or Meggido); that "300 Jews" and a similar number of Arabs were killed in the Arab rioting of 1929 (just over one hundred Jews and a similar number of Arabs died); and so on and on and on.

AGAIN, PAPPE'S ERRORS ARE not merely a matter of sloppiness born of a contempt for that leaven of dullards, "the facts." The book is also awash with errors resulting from the writer's ideological preferences, his interest in blackening the Zionists and whitening the Palestinians. His description of the events of 1920 (in which Pappe proves the dictum that necessity—in this case, an ideological imperative—is the mother of invention) is surely a classic of the genre:

> In April 1920, a Nabi Musa rally [a Muslim celebration commemorating

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> the prophet Moses] clashed with the most aggressive of the Zionist organizations, Beitar, whose members marched provocatively in the streets of Arab Jerusalem at the time of the feast, and a day of violence ended with deaths on both sides.... A [British] commission of inquiry, the Palin Commission, concluded the obvious: that there was growing dissatisfaction among the Palestinian elite with the British pro-Zionist ... policy.

In fact, Pappe's evenhandedness, while morally commendable, is out of place. There was no "provocative" Jewish march through Arab Jerusalem; there was no march at all. What occurred was an unprovoked assault on Jewish passers-by and shops by a politically and religiously inflamed Muslim mob. The subsequent British investigation, embodied in the Palin Report, found that a Muslim Arab religious procession, incited by, among others, Haj Amin al Husseini and Arif al-Arif (a Palestinian journalist), had attacked Jews along Jaffa Road in Jewish (West) Jerusalem and then inside the Old City. Beitar, the youth movement of the right-wing Revisionist Movement, was founded in 1923, so clearly it could not have had a hand in the events of 1920. (Even a postmodernist can see that!) The Palin Report, acknowledging the pogrom for what it was, stated that "all the evidence goes to show that these [Arab] attacks were of a cowardly and treacherous description, mostly against old men, women and children—frequently in the back" (though, to round out the picture, Palin did attribute the rising tide of Arab anger to Britain's pro-Zionist policy).

Brazen inaccuracy similarly marks Pappe's treatment of the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. Pappe writes that the Arab Higher Committee had tried to "negotiate a principled settlement with the Jewish Agency" (it did not); that in "October 1936" the AHC "declared a general strike" (it was declared in May, 1936 and ended in October); that "in August [1937]" Palestinians assassinated "Major Andrew," the British acting Galilee district commissioner (his name was Lewis Andrews, he was a civilian, and he was assassinated in September); and that "quite a few" of the Palestinian dead in the 1936–1939 rebellion were women (there are no accurate figures, but there can be no doubt that only a handful of the three thousand to six thousand Palestinian dead were women, who generally took no part in the rioting and the fighting).

Pappe writes that "in the 1969 election, the moderate Eshkol could not prevail against the more inflexible Golda Meir" (Eshkol simply died in office, and his party, Mapai, selected Meir as his successor, and later, in the general elections of 1969, the incumbent prime minister Meir, heading the Mapai list, ran against, and beat, a collection of right-wing, religious, and left-wing parties); that there were one million Palestinians living outside Palestine by the end of the 1948 war (the number was no more than three hundred thousand); that "the fida'iyyun [literally, self-sacrificers or guerrillas] ... activities initially consisted of attempts to retrieve lost property" (this was probably true of infiltrating Palestinian refugees, but the fida'iyyun, set up by Egypt only in 1954–1955, from the first were engaged in intelligence and terrorist activities, not in property retrieval); that "Lebanon was destroyed in [Israeli] carpet bombing from the air and shelling from the ground" in 1982 (Lebanon was not destroyed, though several neighborhoods in a number of cities were badly damaged, and there was no "carpet bombing"). Again, the list is endless.

Where Pappe's ideological bent is not responsible for outright inventions and errors, it leads instead to narrative lopsidedness. He devotes a full seven pages to instances of Zionist-Arab cooperation and co-existence (which he calls "cohabitation") during the Arab revolt of 1936–1939, but only two pages to the actual revolt and its consequences. Surely the revolt itself was far more important than the handful of concurrent inconsequential Arab-Jewish contacts aiming at co-existence. And Pappe devotes a mere sixteen pages to the revolutionary upheaval of the 1948 war—surely the central event in Palestine's modern history—and two of those pages are maps. Still, 1948 does relatively well in this regard: the 1973 war—which Pappe describes as a "devastating Israeli defeat," echoing Arab propaganda, and the "bloodiest Arab-Israeli confrontation" (in fact, the war of 1947–1949 was bloodier)—gets about half a page. I should add also that Hafez Assad of Syria did not embark on the 1973 war in order to resume the peace process with Israel; he simply wanted to re-conquer the Golan Heights (and perhaps thus to avoid entering a peace process).

Pappe dedicates his book to "Ido and Yonatan, my two lovely boys. May they live not only in a modern Palestine, but also in a peaceful one." His choice of the term "Palestine" rather than "Israel" would seem to indicate that Pappe is looking forward to a polity that will emerge after Israel's disestablishment or demise. He obviously supports a single bi-national state in all of Palestine. And he is no fool. He must know what such a state will look like. A bi-national state, if established tomorrow, would contain roughly five million Jews and four and a half million Arabs (1.3 million Israeli Arabs, including the Arabs of East Jerusalem; two million West Bank Arabs; and close to one and a half million Arabs of the Gaza Strip). There would be instant chaos, as Arab and Jewish communities would vie for dominance and try to settle old scores, and as the two to three million refugees from 1948 and their descendants, now resident in the West Bank and Gaza, would make tracks for, and try to repossess, lost houses and lands in pre-1967 Israel.

Moreover, were the "right of return" to be adopted—as would be demanded by Palestine's Arabs and the surrounding Arab world, perhaps with European endorsement—another million Arabs would pour into the country from the refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, instantly creating an Arab majority in the "bi-national" state. If that state were democratic, the majority would determine its character, and in fairly short order it would become an Arab state with a gradually decreasing Jewish minority. Without doubt, the Arab majority would pass legislation blocking further Jewish immigration into the country; and, equally without doubt, Jews would begin to leave.

But even without implementation of an instant or gradual return of refugees from outside Palestine, Pappe's bi-national state would quickly become an Arab-majority state, given relative Arab and Jewish birthrates. Palestinian Arab families have an average of four or five children (and this includes Israeli Arab households), while Israeli Jewish families tend to have two or three children. Within a decade or so of its creation, the bi-national state would have an Arab majority. I find it difficult to imagine what sort of life Pappe really believes that he and his children and grandchildren can expect as members of a Jewish

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minority in an Arab state. After all, the Jewish minorities in the Islamic Arab world have fared poorly over the centuries, always subject to second-class citizenship and often to brutal oppression and massacre; as late as the 1940s they suffered from discriminatory laws and pogroms (in Baghdad, Tripoli, Aden); and by the 1960s they had all fled, or been expelled from, their native lands. Iraq, with one hundred thirty-five thousand Jews in 1948, has today about fifty Jews; Egypt, once with seventy-five thousand, has about one hundred; Morocco, with two hundred sixty-five thousand in 1948, has about six thousand. For all practical purposes, these countries have been ethnically cleansed of their Jews. Almost no Jews at all are left in Yemen or Algeria, and none, as far as I know, live in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Oman, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates.

A Muslim-dominated Palestine would be even less benign or hospitable toward its Jewish minority. After all, the Palestinians are not a particularly forgiving people (the cry for revenge seems to be on the lips of every suicide bomber), and what they have suffered at Jewish hands since 1947 will not easily be erased from their collective and individual memories. Moreover, the Islamic Arab world, including Arafat's Palestinian Authority, has shown little penchant for democracy. More generally, tolerance of the "other" is not a deeply ingrained tradition in the Muslim Arab world, as the fate of the Arab world's Christian communities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will attest. (Look at Sudan.) Nor would the social and economic gap between the Jews and the Arabs of Pappe's bi-national state make for peaceful co-existence.

So I doubt that Ido and Yonatan will enjoy life in their new Muslim Arab-dominated environment. My prediction is that, whatever their politics, they will quickly repair to Europe or America. And if, contrary to logic, they stick it out, they will enjoy an existence infinitely less free, creative, and pleasant than that currently enjoyed by Israel's Arab minority citizens. This truly is an appalling book. Anyone interested in the real history of Palestine/Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would do well to run vigorously in the opposite direction. ■

István Deák
Resistances

THE BATTLE FOR ROME: THE GERMANS, THE ALLIES, THE PARTISANS, AND THE POPE, SEPTEMBER 1943–JUNE 1944
By Robert Katz
(Simon & Schuster, 418 pp., $28)

THERE WAS A BRIEF PERIOD in European history, roughly from the beginning of the eighteenth century to 1941, when it was easy to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants; when wars were fought by soldiers clothed, equipped, and trained by the state; when men trained to be murderers on behalf of the state were severely punished if they tried to use the same methods when not in military service. During the last sixty years, however, irregular forces have increasingly replaced, or at least complemented, the regular armies. This ominous development in the methods of warfare raises such terribly difficult issues as the legal rights and the moral obligations of both occupation armies and armed resistance movements. The question arises again and again: how are occupation armies to react to the presence of the local equivalents of the legendary Vietnamese "peasants in black pajamas," who may be armed with grenades and guns? How are ordinary civilians to behave in the presence of an increasingly frightened and brutal occupation army? The danger to them from both occupiers and resisters is very great, making it difficult, if not impossible, to remain bystanders.

In the terrible history of World War II, few events illustrate these dilemmas better than those discussed in Robert Katz's very fine book, which is rich in dramatic accounts and challenging analyses. Written with great journalistic verve, Katz's book is also remarkably well documented. The crucial events that it studies occurred on March 23, 1944, when the bombs and the grenades of a group of Communist partisans tore into a marching company of SS policemen in Rome's historic center, killing thirty-three and wounding more than one hundred. A few bystanders were also killed. A day later, in what became one of the war's most infamous reprisals, the SS executed 335 Italians in a cave on the outskirts of Rome. These two incidents have entered history as the Via Rasella bombing and the Ardeatine Caves massacre. Katz, who has lived in Tuscany for a long time, is well qualified to deal with the Italian aspect of these fatal problems. He proved his willingness to tackle difficult issues in one of his previous books, which provoked the family of Pope Pius XII to sue him for "defaming the memory" of that controversial pontiff. As he explains in his new book, that lawsuit almost landed him in jail.

KATZ WISELY BEGINS HIS BOOK with the events of late July 1943, when King Emmanuel III, the army high command, and the fascist Grand Council in Rome overthrew and imprisoned the dictator Mussolini, who had been leading the country and the fascist movement to ruin. Soon thereafter came a secret armistice agreement with the Allies, who were by then in southern Italy, and the flight of the king as well as of the newly appointed prime minister, Army Marshal Pietro Badoglio, to Allied-held territory. These developments left the seat of government empty and the military commanders without any instructions, allowing a German takeover as well as the rescue of Il Duce by a force of parachutists. The freed Mussolini promptly proclaimed a fascist republic at Salò in northern Italy. What made these successful German countermoves possible was a series of brilliant military operations under the command of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, which not only stopped the Allied military advance but also succeeded in disarming and enslaving the numerically superior Italian armies. By mid-October, the German positions in southern Italy were stronger than they had been when Italy was still a Nazi ally.

Katz skillfully describes the enor-

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mous difficulties that the multinational Allied armies—British, American, Polish, French, East Indian, Australian, New Zealander, Brazilian, Moroccan—faced in the mountainous Italian terrain. The two successive amphibious landings south of Rome, at Salerno in September 1943 and at Anzio in January 1944, were near disasters, because the amassed Allied vehicles impeded one another's progress, and because of jealousies between the British and the Americans, and because of the undoubted bravery of the Germans. Another problem for the Allies was that the best of their troops were gradually siphoned off from Italy in order to prepare for the landings in Normandy. When the Allies finally broke through the Italian front in May, 1944, it was the selfishness of U.S. General Mark Clark, the commander of the Fifth Army, that prevented the encircling and the destruction of the German forces. For Clark, it seemed far more important to reach Rome before the British than to defeat the enemy, as Katz and many military experts maintain.

Following the collapse of all semblance of government in Rome, a National Liberation Committee attempted to step into the breach. This resistance umbrella organization consisted of the representatives of the major anti-fascist political parties, but while the committee was often paralyzed by inter-party rivalry, a much more active Military Council, operating under the aegis of the committee, ordered immediate action. Here, amazingly, dedicated anti-Communist army officers were able to cooperate with progressive Catholics, left-wing Socialists, and even the Communist GAP (Patriotic Action Group) Central. The Communists, who hoped to create a revolutionary situation and to change Italy forever, were the best-organized, the bravest, and the most brutal of all the partisan groups. What counts most, as Katz makes clear, is not the successes of the resistance, which were militarily insignificant (though later, in northern Italy, the partisans became a serious problem for the Germans), but the heroism of the resisters. Monarchist generals and young Communist intellectuals risked death in action, and when captured, as the majority sooner or later were, they defied the most abominable tortures inflicted upon them by the German and Italian thugs of the "Koch Gang" and SS Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Kappler's Gestapo.

Until the Allies captured Rome on June 4, 1944, they bombed the capital on several occasions, causing thousands of casualties and exasperating the population—less because of the loss of life and property than because the bombings seemed to indicate that liberation was being delayed. Indeed, there was no shortage of popular enthusiasm for the Allied cause, but the general anti-Nazi uprising hoped for by the resisters never materialized, simply because most Romans just wanted to get by, a fact that Katz might have emphasized more. It is true, though, that the Germans and the Italian fascists felt quite isolated in the capital, which increased the ferocity of their response to partisan provocation.

The Germans' most useful ally seems to have been the pope, whose main concerns were that the Vatican's neutrality be respected, that Rome not be damaged, and that there be no Communist takeover at the moment of liberation. This agenda caused Pius XII to remain silent even at the sight of the deportation, in October, 1943, of more than one thousand Roman Jews, who had traditionally been the pontiff's charges. (One must add, though, that the pope did not forbid the hiding of thousands of other Roman Jews in churches, monasteries, and convents as well as by individual Catholic clerics.) The deportation of Roman Jews boasts a respectable scholarly literature, most notably Susan Zuccotti's excellent *Under His Very Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy*; and Katz adds some new information culled from various archives. He also provides a convincing description of how the Romans trusted the pope, whom they saw as the savior of their city. In truth, the pope played a significant role in the Germans' proclaiming Rome an open city; and not only the population but also the Allies profited from this, because they could conquer the city in June virtually without firing a shot.

On the Allied side, the British were the most reluctant to treat Rome officially as sacred ground, but in reality all the combatants silently agreed to deal with it as cautiously as possible. Relatively little was destroyed in Rome, no more than in Paris. In Paris it was the German local command that resisted Hitler's wish that the city be burned, but Hitler himself seems to have wanted to avoid the wholesale destruction of Rome. Compare all this to the Germans' ruthless treatment of Belgrade, Leningrad, and Warsaw, as well as their willingness to expose Budapest to a prolonged siege—but then the kind of atrocities that marked the Via Rasella and Ardeatine Caves massacres were nearly common occurrences in eastern and southeastern Europe. Only in such western countries as Italy and France could the killing of a few hundred civilians lead to a public uproar; only there would such incidents become the symbols of a nation's heroism and suffering.

THE VIA RASELLA ATTACK WAS planned and executed by a few young men and women—a laboratory worker, a government clerk, a bunch of university students. They noticed that a German military police company daily chose the same route, the same time, and the same song for its march back from a shooting range to the barracks, and that this route led through the narrow passageway of the Via Rasella. To carry out the attack, which is breathtakingly described by Katz, the partisans obtained the permission of their superiors in the resistance. The scene must have been horrifying, with body parts flying around, wounded men lying next to their own arms and legs, several Germans permanently blinded, and the survivors in total panic. Since the German soldiers did not know where the attack had come from, they sprayed the neighboring buildings with bullets, causing further deaths. Hitler and Himmler demanded massive retaliation, whereas German diplomats in Rome insisted on no reprisals, as that might make the local population even more hostile. The decision to shoot ten Italians for every dead German represented a compromise decreed by Kesselring, the southern front's supreme commander. The procedure had to be improvised, since this was to be the first German reprisal in Italy.

Responsibility for the executions fell on Kappler, who spent a whole night trying to draw up a list of Italian *Todeskandidaten*—men who, for one reason or another, were doomed to die in any case. Since there happened to be only three men in Rome under death sentence for anti-German activity, Kappler was forced to cast his net wider, until the jails in the city were nearly emptied of political prisoners. Female members of the resistance movement in captivity were not even considered, but seventy-eight perfectly innocent Jewish men were added

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to the roster, by the "logical" argument that because Jews were under a collective death sentence, one might as well dispose of some of them on this occasion. The victims were transported by truck to the Ardeatine Caves, where they were killed in groups of five, with a shot in the back of the head, but because most German policemen were untrained in such things, the initially well-organized shootings deteriorated into a drunken chaos.

During his trial, in 1948, Kappler claimed that he had threatened eventual shirkers with execution. As a result of this statement, all his co-defendants were acquitted, but it was later shown that no such threat had been uttered, and that a junior officer had refused to fire his gun. He was in no way punished for his disobedience; nor was any other German soldier or policeman punished anywhere else in Hitler's Europe for refusing to kill Jews and other victims. Later it turned out that 335 (not 330) persons had been executed, among them a general, many other officers, Communists, intellectuals, Jews, and a priest from the resistance movement. Remarkably, none of those about to be killed, most of them young and politically committed, turned against their executioners. This, too, should show how wrong it is to blame the Jews, who were often elderly people, children, and women, for allowing themselves to be slaughtered. Only one victim tried to run away: he turned out to be an Austrian military deserter pretending to be Italian. He was caught but not taken back to the caves, because only Italians were to be killed there. He survived the war.

KATZ THOROUGHLY DISCUSSES the papal reaction to the bomb attack and to the execution of the hostages. German diplomats had appealed for the pope's help in preventing a massive retribution, but the pope was so outraged by the partisan attack, which raised the specter of a Communist takeover, that he did nothing. The day after the Via Rasella attack, the semi-official Vatican newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano* warned against the repetition of such acts, mostly because it would lead to the death of many innocent people. This, in turn, drew the wrath of Kesselring, who protested that those executed were convicted criminals.

Following the Via Rasella attack, the Germans increased the number of their SS policemen in Rome from a few hundred to a few thousand, who then arrested, tortured, and executed many resistance fighters. Even Katz's main hero, the American O.S.S. agent Peter Tompkins, whose secret broadcasts from Rome greatly helped the Allied cause, was forced to hide for his life. When the Americans arrived at last on June 4, they were greeted by delirious masses. Undoubtedly, many of the celebrants had previously hailed Il Duce with the same delirious enthusiasm.

Kesselring, Kappler, and some of the others responsible for the Ardeatine Caves massacre were arrested after the war and tried by either a British or an Italian military court. Charged with repeatedly ordering the massacre of civilians, Kesselring was sentenced to death by a British military court in 1947, but because many in the West, including Winston Churchill, objected to the sentence, it was commuted to life without parole. He was freed in 1952. Kappler's trial took place in 1948, after the West had begun to rally against Soviet Bolshevism. By then, many Italians had forgotten the days of Rome the "Open City" as it was filmed by Roberto Rossellini in 1945. In Rossellini's shattering film, a devout priest and an atheistic Communist fight together against the Nazi and fascist beasts, while the actress Anna Magnani, playing the role of the representative of the people, lends her support to their heroic struggle. By 1948, however, the Communists—not the Germans—were for many the enemy.

The court trying Kappler benefited from his painstaking description, lasting eight days, of what had happened in March, 1944. The death penalty having been abolished in Italy, Kappler was given a life sentence without parole, less for the killing of the 330 people than for the killing of the supernumerary five. As one would have said in the Soviet bloc at the time, Kappler had "over-fulfilled his norm." Katz explains that the five extra men got there as the result of a miscalculation, but when the Germans realized their mistake they saw no choice but to get rid of the five who had seen it all. Kappler's other crime, which in itself deserved the most severe punishment, was his unhesitating use of torture against political prisoners in Rome.

IN ONE OF THE MANY IRONIES OF World War II, the SS company bombed at Via Rasella was part of a Bozen (Bolzano, South Tyrol) battalion, meaning that, although German-Austrians by nationality and conviction, the men hailed from an area that had been part of Italy between the two wars. Similarly, the SS company that massacred nearly 642 French civilians at Oradour, in June, 1944, was made up mostly of Alsatians—that is, that they had been, and would become again, French citizens. At their trial in 1953, public sentiment in Alsace-Lorraine forced the virtual acquittal of these "Frenchmen dragged into German service against their will."

One wonders what the point of the massive executions was, considering that afterward the German High Command made only a brief announcement. In any case, there was not much resistance activity in Rome in the few weeks left before the arrival of American and other Allied troops. Note also that the entire tragedy might have been avoided by a rapid American advance on Rome. In January, 1944, when the Allies landed at Anzio, a bare thirty miles from Rome, they took the Germans so much by surprise that a single American jeep carrying a lieutenant and a driver easily made it into the capital and returned unscathed. Katz quotes Kesselring's chief of staff, General Siegfried Westphal, who later wrote that, for the Germans, this was a "breathtaking situation" in which "no one could have stopped a bold advance guard entering the Holy City." But the American commanders hesitated, and Kesselring rallied enough troops to counterattack.

The German army in Italy surrendered to the Allies only a few days before the complete surrender of all German forces in May, 1945; before that time, there was extensive guerrilla activity in the northern part of the country, mostly by Communist partisans, who established themselves in large areas. According to Claudio Pavone and other historians, there was a genuine civil war between the partisans and the fascists, marked by atrocities on both sides.

IN COURT, BOTH KESSELRING AND Kappler invoked the defense of "superior orders," but by then the Nuremberg International Court had rejected such a defense, and even the wartime German Nazi Military Code had made amply clear that superior orders did not legalize murder and other illegal acts. Whether the Ardeatine Caves massacre can be justified on the basis of international law has been the subject of

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much controversy. The Hague International Convention of 1907, which regulated relations between the occupiers and the civilian inhabitants of an occupied country, postulated that the latter obey reasonable orders by the occupier; thus a certain degree of collaboration with the enemy was judged to be necessary. As for civilian resistance, the convention authorized it only during an enemy invasion, and even then only if the guerrillas, short of being in uniform, were wearing a conspicuous badge or armband, carrying their weapons openly, organized into a discernible command structure, and abiding by the laws of war. Such conditions no underground fighter during World War II even dreamed of obeying. Yet it was made clear at The Hague that the occupying power was entitled to treat violators of the above rules as common criminals.

Nor was hostage taking, and thus hostage shooting, necessarily illegal; after all, one might see it as a relatively humane measure when compared with random revenge and retribution. This right was recognized at one of the so-called American follow-up trials at Nuremberg, that of Field Marshal Wilhelm List and other German commanders in southeastern Europe. But the court did not say how many hostages one was allowed to shoot for every dead soldier. Judging by the German measures taken in Russia and the Balkans during World War II, Kesselring's ten-to-one ratio was not one of the most barbaric. Before the end of the war and following the German surrender, the Allied occupation forces, especially the French and the Soviets, took and occasionally shot hostages as well as burned down houses and even a few villages, in retribution for real or suspected German Werwolf partisan actions.

Robert Katz's two other most admired heroes, the partisans Elena (Carla Capponi) and Paolo (Rosario Bentivegna), received the highest Italian military decorations after the war; they married each other and became Communist deputies in parliament. Neither they nor the other partisans ever publicly wondered about the correctness of their actions on that fatal day in March, 1944. Yet in the long run the Italian Communists did not profit from their wartime heroism and ruthlessness: the Party did not manage to come to power, nor did the partisans' dream of a just and equal society become a reality. Only from the standpoint of postwar Italian nationalism was the Via Rasella attack not a wasteful exercise. It strengthened the image abroad, so carefully cultivated by both the Italian government and the film industry, of the Italians as brave anti-fascists and the innocent victims of Teutonic barbarity. No mention was ever made of such other possible Italian national symbols as the gassings of Abyssinian villages; the aggression against Albania, Greece, France, and Yugoslavia; and the concentration camps set up in the Italian occupation zones in southeastern Europe.

As for the Germans, or at least the more conservative among them, they now had their martyrs languishing in Italian prisons. All the German political parties, Social Democrats included, put pressure on the Italian government to release Kappler, "who had only obeyed orders." Owing to Italian public opinion, however, it was not until 1977 that Kappler was transferred to an unguarded military hospital; from there he "escaped" with the help of his German wife, whom he had married while in prison. He died in Stuttgart the following year.

Finally, there was the case of SS Captain Erich Priebke, Kappler's second in command at Rome Gestapo headquarters, who escaped to Eva and Juan Peron's Argentina at the end of the war. For this he used the famous "Rat Line" created by Catholic Church officials to facilitate the flight of such major war criminals as Adolf Eichmann and Josef Mengele. As Katz explains, thousands of other Nazi war criminals went the same way. But Priebke was unmasked in Argentina in 1996 and extradited to Italy. Having been tried and freed by a military court, public demonstrations forced his retrial for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the following year; the trial resulted in a life sentence without parole. Subsequently, however, his sentence was commuted to fifteen years under house arrest. In his case, too, Priebke's undoubtedly punishable crime would have been his extremely brutal treatment of prisoners.

The partisan activity in World War II, directed against the abominable Nazis, is generally seen as justified; but the question must be asked why the anti-Soviet guerrilla activity of, say, the same Polish partisans who had previously fought the German occupiers was not equally justified. And why not the guerrilla wars waged by the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan, the anti-American struggle of the Vietcong in Vietnam, the Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel, or the recent anti-American guerrilla activity in Iraq? Armed resistance during World War II was romanticized because the Nazis were such an appalling enemy, and because in that war the guerrillas' targets were still mainly soldiers. Innocent victims, such as the wives and the children of German servicemen who died because they happened to be in a military train that was blown up by partisans, were collateral damage. But ever since the 1950s, when the much-applauded Algerian freedom fighters began to lob bombs into crowded shops and cafés, innocent civilians have become the favorite targets of guerrillas everywhere. And today we tend to describe freedom fighters as terrorists.

Terrorist attacks will not go away; the question is whether to repress them with utter ruthlessness or to try to win over both partisans and local population with a certain degree of moderation. There is no proof that one method is more efficient than the other, but it is certain that the first method causes enormous suffering. The Hague Conventions regulating irregular warfare have been more a failure than a success. What is needed is a recognition of reality, namely that future wars will increasingly consist of civilians shooting at soldiers from hiding and frightened soldiers killing innocent civilians. And what is needed, in the aftermath of such a sobering recognition, is an attempt to create a new international law for the more efficient regulation of this type of horrible warfare. Robert Katz's book provides fine arguments for this necessary debate. ■

Hurricane Hymnal

"Put your trust in sea-glass," whisper
Lovers, kissing. "Lay a towel out
For shells." A good
Anthology
To have handy once New
Jersey's swept away.

"Just stay
Inside the eye, you'll be
Safe. I once was
Saved that way."

ANTHONY HAWLEY

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WASHINGTON DIARIST

Singled Out

THOUGH THE DECEMBER movie *Mona Lisa Smile* failed at the box office, its romanticized portrayal of Wellesley College in the 1950s as a place where well-coiffed women had little ambition beyond learning proper etiquette reignited a heated debate on the virtues of single-sex schools. In fact, three months later, Wellesley's alumnae website still offers an interactive section devoted to a discussion of the film and the future of single-sex education. As one graduate summed up in an article for *Boston* magazine: "If Wellesley women are so smart and talented ... why do they need to sequester themselves on an all-female campus conceived in the 19th century?" It's an obvious question with a clear answer: They don't.

WHEN PEOPLE LEARN THAT I ATTENDED Mount Holyoke, a women's college (*not* an all-girls school, as any alum worth her weight is quick to point out), they usually say something along the lines of: "Was that sort of like a finishing school? How did you exist without men?" The questions are not malicious. Many people genuinely want to know why I would commit to four years of higher education—ostensibly in preparation for the real, co-ed world—in an atmosphere so antithetical to it.

ALL-WOMEN'S COLLEGES ORIGINALLY offered their students both refuge from and preparation for male-dominated society. And, in many cases, such schools were the only alternatives for smart women, as the Ivy League and other top-notch colleges had yet to become co-educational. Fortunately the landscape shifted and with it the prevalence of women's colleges declined—in 1960 there were 298; today there are 67. Some were forced to admit men in order to stay afloat financially, some simply shuttered altogether. Of the original Seven Sisters (the all-female equivalent of the formerly all-male Ivy League), Radcliffe has been absorbed into Harvard; Barnard is closely tied to Columbia; Vassar has gone co-ed. The remaining schools—Bryn Mawr, Mount Holyoke, Smith, and Wellesley—face a quandary: relevance.

TO GIRD AGAINST CHARGES OF OBSOLESCENCE, proponents of single-sex education have armed themselves with a battery of statistics citing how many women's college graduates go on to run Fortune 500 companies, hold elected office, pursue advanced degrees, and so on. But these women achieve great things in a world with men not because they were educated in a world without them; they achieve great things because these schools offer excellent academics and thus attract and cultivate ambitious, capable students—who would likely have succeeded professionally regardless of their alma mater. (Bryn Mawr, Mount Holyoke, Smith, and Wellesley all rank among *U.S. News and World Report*'s top 25 liberal arts colleges.)

OTHERS ARGUE THAT BOYS DROWN GIRLS out in the classroom and that single-sex education is essential if female students are to learn and to build confidence. Studies certainly do exist to substantiate those claims. But after the American Association of University Women conducted a survey of the available literature in 1998, it noted that "Several of the studies found that although single-sex schools seem to have positive effects on girls' achievement compared with coed schools, once the findings were adjusted for student socio-economic status, pre-enrollment ability, selectivity of the school, and other variables, the differences diminished or disappeared." And, even if single-sex education makes sense during childhood, by age 18, it's time to treat students as mature adults who can fend for themselves, both in and out of the classroom.

MOST STUDENTS CHOOSE COLLEGES based on social factors as well as educational merit, and so women's colleges are forced to straddle a tenuous ideological line: They must argue that learning is best done without men while also admitting that life without them is incomplete. So view books are peppered with men (grabbing a drink in the dining hall! lounging on the quad!), and websites make special efforts to assure prospective students that the social climate is cheerfully co-ed, even if the classroom is not. In truth, it's difficult to have it both ways. Mount Holyoke women are bused to and from other campuses so they can interact with the opposite sex. But cautiously disembarking from an all-female shuttle in front of an Amherst College party offered a brand of sexism that I'd never seen in a classroom. Women were, quite literally, objects: They were imported, admired, and packed off on the last bus. The next day, Amherst women could have intellectual conversations with their male peers in the dining hall; for Mount Holyoke women, their only chance was in front of a keg.

CONVERSELY, MEN AT HOLYOKE WERE either fetishized—"There's one living on the fifth floor of Ham Hall! He's an exchange student from Dartmouth!"—or demonized. Campus slogans spurred an us-versus-them mentality: a T-shirt that announced MOUNT HOLYOKE IS NOT A GIRLS' SCHOOL WITHOUT MEN. IT'S A WOMEN'S COLLEGE WITHOUT BOYS was a big seller. It was a hugely regressive form of female bonding, suggesting a defensiveness that only reinforced the perception of women as second-class citizens.

SO, WHEN PEOPLE ASK WHY I ATTENDED Mount Holyoke, I answer honestly: I went for the brainpower of the students and the caliber of the professors—some of the smartest people I've ever encountered, regardless of gender. To remain viable, colleges like Mount Holyoke and Wellesley need to align their mission with the possibility of progress. They need to distinguish themselves not through gender limitations, but solely through their educational excellence. Many may argue that going co-ed would destroy the schools' identity. Nonsense. These schools are superior in spite of, not because of, their single-sex status. (Did Harvard lose its reason for existing when it began accepting women?) Claiming otherwise only condescends to their highly capable students and reinforces the absurdity that succeeding in a co-ed world first demands steeling oneself in gender isolation. "I may not enjoy the social life at Wellesley at all, but the academics are well worth the sacrifice," laments one *Princeton Review* survey respondent. It's the twenty-first century. I thought women were done sacrificing.

KARA BASKIN

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When Jobs Are Illegal, Only Illegals Will Have Jobs

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

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

My headline may exaggerate a bit but not much. The controversy over President Bush's immigration plan overlooks the fact that some of our illegal immigration problem arises from government regulations mandating unsustainable wages and benefits.

It sounds good to require employers to pay a "living wage" and provide health, parental leave, and many other benefits. But some workers are not economically productive enough to make those high-minded requirements cost-effective for the employer. **Mandated benefits make the young, the low-skilled, and the poorly educated legally unemployable.** Their jobs have been made illegal.

Since it is easier to recognize a problem when someone else is guilty, let's look at Europe. Most European countries have generous social safety nets partially provided by employers. Benefits such as six weeks of paid vacation, short workweeks, health care, and maternal leave all increase the costs of employing workers.

The result is that some people have fabulous jobs, and others have nothing. Workers whose productivity does not justify these compensation levels are out of luck. Unemployment in European countries has stabilized at 8 percent—a scandal by American standards. European youth (too young to have acquired skills commensurate with these compensation levels) spend years in universities, in socially enforced idleness, waiting to be allowed to do something genuinely useful.

In the meantime, there are still jobs for which no one is willing to pay the legally required compensation package. All over Europe, immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East do those jobs. These Muslim immigrants, barred from the higher-class jobs, are angry about their exclusion.

Of course, no one admits to planning this outcome. But that outcome is the inevitable consequence of years of legislation. European progressives have done a fine job of voting for bigger compensation packages. They break their arms patting themselves on the back for their compassion. But they conveniently overlook the fact that these compensation packages were purchased by cutting off the lower rungs of the job ladder. People who would have acquired valuable job skills and work habits no longer have the opportunity to do so.

Similarly, American teenagers hang out at the mall, while Mexican immigrants cut the grass and do the babysitting in the teenagers' middle-class neighborhoods. Suburban families prefer to pay those who work on a regular basis and who are often illegal; such work, which used to be a rite of passage for the young, has been made illegal by the imposition of mandated wages and benefits. How many American teenagers realistically need their own health benefits or paid parental leave?

In the 2003 legislative session alone, California passed eleven bills that the Chamber of Commerce considered "job killers," including increased health care requirements and increased costs of frivolous employee lawsuits. All this is in addition to California's expensive paid family-leave plan and inflexible wage and hour restrictions. Like their European counterparts, **California progressives expect employers to solve all the problems of the world, including childcare and health care.**

Immigration policy is a mess, no mistake. But until we address the problem of government's mandating unsustainable compensation levels, we will continue to have immigration problems. When we make jobs illegal, we ensure that only illegals will have those jobs.

—Jennifer Roback Morse

Jennifer Roback Morse is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

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
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